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THE SELF-DELEGATION FALSE ALARM: ANALYZING AUER
DEFERENCE’S EFFECTS ON AGENCY RULES
Daniel E. Walters *
Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen-
cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This
doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is
necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc-
trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first
instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of
powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages
agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later
be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer-
ence—has helped to persuade the Supreme Court to take up this term
the question of whether to overturn the doctrine. Yet, surprisingly, the
self-delegation thesis has never been tested.
This Article scrutinizes the thesis empirically, using an original
and extensive dataset of the texts of federal rules from 1982 to 2016. My
linguistic analysis reveals that agencies did not measurably increase the
vagueness of their writing in response to Auer. If anything, rule writ-
ing arguably became more specific over time, at least by one measure,
despite Auer’s increasing prominence.
These findings run against common wisdom, but they should not
be at all surprising. The self-delegation thesis depends on a model of
agency behavior that is inconsistent with what is known about the insti-
tutional pressures and cognitive horizons that cause agencies to pursue
clarity in rule writing. By revealing the failures of theoretical predictions
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about Auer, this Article more generally draws attention to the need to
test behavioral theories of administrative law against empirical reality
before unsettling settled law.
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INTRODUCTION
A core concern of administrative law is constraining the discretion of
agencies, given that they often operate under broad delegations of
authority in statutes that contain vague standards and aspirations. As
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis described it, administrative law primarily
ought to encourage agencies to exercise their “rule-making power to
replace vagueness with clarity.”1 Much of the development of American
administrative law in recent decades has aimed to promote and fine-tune
notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) as a means of reducing discretion in the administrative state
and making law more certain.2
Today, leading scholars and jurists view a core administrative law
doctrine known as Auer deference as an existential threat to this project
and even an affront to fundamental constitutional separation of powers
norms. Auer deference (also sometimes referred to as Seminole Rock defer-
ence3) holds that a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations should defer to the agency’s construction so long as it is not
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”4 This principle
crucially allows agencies to avoid the impractical (and potentially
debilitating) need to make every slight adjustment in regulatory
understanding of existing rules through cumbersome formal amend-
ment of written rules.5 With Auer deference available, agencies can
1. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 56–57 (1971).
2. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L.J. 1490, 1491–92
(1992) (observing that “most American academic students of administrative law have been
overly enamored of the formal beauty of the notice-and-comment process” and have
“reiterated unanimously over the years that agencies are free to choose between
rulemaking and other forms of agency action for making policy”); Reuel E. Schiller,
Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53
Admin. L. Rev. 1139, 1150 (2001) (noting that a shift from ad hoc adjudication to
rulemaking and policy statements was “the most common recommendation of all the
critics who examined the administrative state at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the
1960s”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667, 1698 (1975) (suggesting that a “possible response to the problems created by
broad legislative delegation is to acknowledge the large discretion enjoyed by agencies and
to require that it be exercised in accordance with consistently applied general rules”).
3. The alternate moniker refers to a 1945 case, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
that initially used the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” formulation in response to an
agency’s “administrative construction” of its regulation. 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). A wave
of recent scholarship suggests that the strong version of deference that exists today is of
relatively recent vintage, mostly attributable to the Supreme Court’s unanimous restate-
ment of the principle in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). See infra section I.A.
4. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
5. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. Technically, as long as there is a gap in
the meaning of an existing regulatory text, an agency can interpret that gap in
nonbinding fashion without resorting to notice-and-comment rulemaking whether it
receives deference or not. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012) (providing exemptions from
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instead issue guidance documents or policy statements that merely inter-
pret existing rules in ways that achieve regulatory goals. However, the
argument against Auer deference posits that if agencies know that they
will win most cases involving their interpretations of previously promul-
gated rules, they have strong incentives to write vague rules in the first
instance.6 That way, it is claimed, agencies will be able at a later time to
package a more significant change as a regulatory interpretation and
need only make a plausible argument that this new interpretation is
loosely contemplated by the original rule’s capacious language.7 With
such a strategy, agencies could systematically “self-delegate” by writing
rules that subsequently allow them to circumvent the APA’s call for
notice-and-comment rulemaking, effectively affording themselves the
opportunity to make significant policy decisions merely by issuing guid-
ance.8
Consider Title IX of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimina-
tion “on the basis of sex” in public schools.9 In 2000, under this statutory
the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement for nonbinding interpretive rules and
general statements of policy). But the promise of deference frees agencies to make that
decision with less concern about being haled into court and subjected to probing review.
6. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Auer “encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it
the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases”).
7. See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 Duke L.J. 81, 102 (2015)
(“[A]fter an agency promulgates a legislative rule through notice and comment, it can
then continuously revise its interpretations without meaningful notice to regulated entities
and with little judicial accountability.”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole
Rock’s Domain, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1449, 1453 (2011) (“[B]road judicial deference to
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations may enable an agency to enact binding
rules without subjecting itself either to meaningful procedural safeguards or to rigorous
judicial scrutiny.”).
8. Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1252, 1254 (2016)
(“[C]ritics contend that agencies rely on guidance documents in ways that circumvent the
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. Their concern is that agencies are turning
increasingly to guidance to establish norms that have significant de facto weight without
the participation and accountability virtues of a notice-and-comment process.”). This
general turn might feed a perceived trend away from the quasi-constitutional norms of the
APA and its preference for traditional forms of agency policymaking toward less formal
(and less accountable) forms of policymaking, such as guidance documents and policy
statements. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (2014) (“Our thesis is simple but powerful:
the actual workings of the administrative state have increasingly diverged from the
assumptions animating the APA and classic judicial decisions that followed.”); Mila
Sohoni, The Administrative Constitution in Exile, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 923, 964 (2016)
(“The aspects of administrative law that enable procedurally unfettered regulation have a
far larger footprint now than they formerly did; they have attained a new level of
importance in the allocation of power across various parts of the government.”).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .”).
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provision, the U.S. Department of Education promulgated a rule that
allowed school districts to install sex-separate restrooms in public school
buildings but required these separate facilities to be comparable.10 Six-
teen years later, in response to questions schools were confronting over
how to accommodate transgender students within this regulatory frame-
work, the Department issued an opinion letter that further interpreted
its own regulation to require that “[w]hen a school elects to separate or
treat students differently on the basis of sex,” it must “treat transgender
students consistent with their gender identity.”11 The Fourth Circuit
upheld the Department’s policy, giving Auer deference to the agency’s
interpretation contained in the opinion letter in part because the origi-
nal regulation simply did not speak to how transgender students should
be accommodated.12
Suppose that the Department of Education had actually been clearer
in its 2000 rule, explicitly stating how it expected transgender students to
be treated. Suppose further that the Department in 2016 wanted to
adopt a different stance with respect to the treatment of transgender stu-
dents and issued an opinion letter to that effect. In a response to a
properly framed challenge to the opinion letter, the Department could
argue that Auer deference should apply to its new interpretation con-
tained in the letter; however, there would be limits to how far the clear
language in the original rule could be stretched before the subsequent
interpretation would become “plainly inconsistent” with it. By speaking
clearly and explicitly about transgender students in its original rule, the
Department would have substantially limited its own flexibility down the
road and very well may have been forced to pursue any changed view in
2016 by going through the full notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
Return now to what actually happened. Whether the Department
actually intended it or not at the time, the fact that it left out any men-
tion of transgender students in the original rule in 2000 gave the
Department of Education interpretive flexibility in 2016 when it decided
to make clear that schools must treat transgender students in a manner
consistent with their gender identity. Auer deference all but guaranteed
that the exercise of this flexibility would not be substantially curtailed by
reviewing courts.
If agencies see similar scenarios often enough, they may come to
realize that there are potential benefits to making their rules in the first
10. 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2018) (providing that schools “may provide separate toilet,
locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for
students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the
other sex”).
11. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James A. Ferg-Cadima, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Office for Civil Rights, Opinion Letter (Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review)).
12. Id. at 722–23.
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place more amenable to capacious interpretation down the road. For
instance, perhaps on reflection the Department would realize that it
could have even more discretion in the Title IX domain were it to write
something like “schools should not discriminate on the basis of sex
except when it is reasonable to fulfill the purposes of Title IX.” Such a
woefully vague (even perhaps nonsensical) construction would only give
more flexibility to the Department at a later time to pivot in and out of
various specific approaches to protecting (or not protecting) transgender
students.
Owing to concern about expansive agency discretion, critics of the
Auer doctrine—including current Harvard Law School Dean John
Manning13 and several current and former Supreme Court Justices14—
claim that the doctrine creates perverse incentives for agencies to make
their regulations unclear (or at least not worry too much if they are),
knowing that the courts will back agencies up if they later decide to issue
informal opinion letters or other guidance documents interpreting those
regulations as they please. 15 In other words, the critics’ claim, as
Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have characterized it, is
that “agencies will issue vague, broad regulations, knowing full well that
when the time comes, they will be able to impose the interpretation they
prefer.”16
This argument, which might be called the “self-delegation” or “per-
verse incentives” thesis, has powerfully captured the attention of judges
and scholars alike because it cuts straight through normatively contested
debates about whether any deference to administrative action is desirable
as a policy matter. The critics posit that, at least when it comes to defer-
ence to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations, judicial defer-
ence inexorably leads to agencies expanding the scope of their own
discretion through a kind of regulatory sandbagging. Auer, its critics
claim, perversely encourages agencies to promulgate indeterminate
regulations with the intention that they can be molded through interpre-
tive moves made at a later time without the need to go through the
notice-and-comment process.
13. See infra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.
14. See infra section I.B.
15. See infra section II.A.
16. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 297, 308 (2017) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness];
see also Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 Ohio St. L.J.
813, 818 (2015) (“If Auer requires deference to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous
(but not unambiguous) regulations, agencies would maximize future flexibility and power
by promulgating ambiguous regulations.”); John Yoo & James C. Phillips, With Kavanaugh,
the Court Could Tame the Administrative State, Nat’l Rev. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2018/10/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-administrative-state/
[https://perma.cc/YC2V-5P89] (arguing that Auer “motivates agencies to maximize their
power by promulgating ambiguous regulations”).
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Of course, the possibility that agencies could interpret their regula-
tions without going through notice-and-comment procedures is some-
what consistent with the APA’s core compromises.17 Reasonable people
might well disagree about whether Auer strikes precisely the right balance
between flexibility and fair notice when agencies seek to flesh out rules
on the back end of the administrative process.18 But it is much harder to
disagree that a doctrine that causes agencies literally to augment their
own authority—and purposefully to withhold their understanding of the
law from those who bear its burdens—is flawed, both pragmatically and
constitutionally. That is presumably why the self-delegation thesis has had
such sway in the Supreme Court and among legal practitioners and why
the Court now appears to be on the verge of overturning or significantly
limiting Auer deference.19
17. See Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 175, 179 (2014) (describing the APA’s, and the Court’s, “preference” for an
administrative law that affords agencies great flexibility in how they proceed). Agencies
thus have, under current law, vast discretion to choose from a wide range of policymaking
forms, only some of which require extensive formal public engagement and purely
prospective application, and they use these authorities liberally. See generally Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, 1313 (1992)
(explaining that agencies can “make a substantive nonlegislative rulemaking document
binding on private parties” through the issuance of an interpretive rule); Nina A.
Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 Cornell L.
Rev. 397, 398 (2007) (noting that the volume of agencies’ general statements of policy and
interpretive rules, as compared to legislative rules promulgated through notice-and-
comment procedures, is “massive”); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and
Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 159, 160 (2000)
(discussing the “growing tendency of American administrative agencies to return to what
we, in the United States, think of as informal administrative procedures”); Peter L. Strauss,
Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential
Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 804 (2001) (“Publication rules—interpretative rules,
statements of general policy, staff manuals, and the like—are an important element in the
hierarchy of agency law.”).
18. See Clarke, supra note 17, at 191 (noting that the question with regard to the
propriety of deference doctrines is “always relative: what’s the best way to strike the
pragmatic balance”).
19. In December 2018, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in
Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15, 2018 WL 6439837, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2018), a case involving a
regulatory interpretation by the Department of Veterans Affairs and squarely presenting
the question of whether Auer and Seminole Rock should be overruled. See Amy Howe, One
New Grant, One Dissent from the Denial of Review, SCOTUSblog (Dec. 10, 2018),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/one-new-grant-one-dissent-from-the-denial-of-review/
[https://perma.cc/UA7J-K2QX]. The grant, along with the Court’s decision to limit the
review to the question of whether Auer and Seminole Rock should be overturned—the
petitioner had presented the alternative question of whether Auer deference should be
replaced with a canon of regulatory construction, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i,
Kisor v. O’Rourke, No. 18-15 (U.S. June 29, 2018), 2018 WL 3239696—has led many Court
watchers to predict that the Court will use the case as a vehicle to overturn the doctrine.
See, e.g., Ellen M. Gilmer, Deference Rule May Be on the Chopping Block, E&E News (Dec.
10, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060109209 [https://perma.cc/3ZRE-3U8T].
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All of this raises the question: Does the self-delegation thesis have
any basis in reality? Recognizing how important evidence is to the future
of the debate over Auer, this Article scrutinizes the self-delegation thesis
from an empirical perspective. I test the thesis by analyzing the linguistic
clarity of an original and extensive dataset of federal rules from 1982 to
2016.20 My analysis reveals that agencies did not measurably increase the
vagueness of their rules in response to Auer. If anything, rule writing
became more specific over time despite Auer’s increasing prominence.21
The findings persist across a range of measurement strategies and model-
ing specifications.
These results are striking when considered in light of the promi-
nence and influence of the criticisms that have been leveled at Auer in
recent years. Yet, given what social scientists know about how agency offi-
cials make decisions in the real world, the lack of empirical evidence of
an “Auer effect” on rule writing should not be as surprising as it might be
to Auer’s critics.22 The self-delegation thesis is based on a simplified model
of the choices officials must make in determining the timing of clarifica-
tion of their meaning. Regulators issue rules to address certain problems
before them, and as a result they always face functional pressures in the
short term for making rules clear. After all, it will presumably be difficult
to ensure compliance if regulated entities cannot understand what a rule
means, and changes in administration (and the political uncertainty that
follows) likewise often favor locking in policy in ways that might bind
potentially hostile future overseers. Moreover, Auer’s critics appear to
overlook entirely how other core features of administrative law reinforce
agencies’ short-term focus. The most immediate legal concern that
agency rule writers face is the threat of vacatur under “hard look” review
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious clause.23 Hard look review,
through its imperative that agencies thoroughly justify a chosen policy
The critical vote will likely come from Justice Kavanaugh, who predicted years ago that the
Court would “someday” overrule Auer. Jimmy Hoover, ‘Auer Someday Will Be Overruled,’
Kavanaugh Said in 2016, Law360 (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.law360.com/appellate/
articles/1112357/-auer-someday-will-be-overruled-kavanaugh-said-in-2016 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting, however, that then-Judge
Kavanaugh “was careful to point out in his speech that ‘these are not necessarily my wants,
nor my fears, just my predictions’”).
20. This range of years was selected based on data availability. The White House
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs’ list of economically significant rules—the list
from which the sample was generated—extended from 1981 to the present. It appeared
that the records from 1981 were incomplete, so that year was excluded. Likewise, 2017 was
excluded because data were available only for part of the year. The 1982 to 2016 range also
makes for a roughly symmetric set of years before and after the 1997 Auer decision. See
infra section III.A.1.
21. See infra sections III.B–.E.
22. See infra sections IV.A–.B.
23. See infra section IV.C.
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over its alternatives, creates incentives for clarity in rules—precisely the
opposite of what Auer allegedly encourages.24
These and other factors are abstracted away in the simplified model
that implicitly stands behind the self-delegation thesis and that appears
to assume that Auer is the only legal factor affecting agencies’ decisions.
More generally, and overlaying all these factors favoring clarity, agencies
have limited bandwidth to address all the considerations that might
affect tradeoffs between providing clarity now or later. As with individuals
more generally, agency officials can be expected to discount long-term
benefits and overvalue short-term gains.25 Auer’s critics’ claims about the
doctrine’s perverse incentives run counter to these well-documented fea-
tures of agency behavior and human cognition that lead agencies to
focus more on immediate outcomes at the expense of longer-term strate-
gic gambits.26
In short, recognizing the full range of institutional and cognitive
factors likely at play makes plain why no one should be at all surprised
that the self-delegation thesis finds no support when subjected to careful
empirical inquiry.
Beyond the obvious implication that the ongoing assault on Auer
deference needs revisiting, the faulty assumptions of the self-delegation
thesis point more generally to the importance of an evidence-based
understanding of how administrative law doctrine and institutional struc-
ture shape agency behavior. Claims about the behavioral effects of
administrative law are both pervasive and fundamental to the field, but
they are too infrequently addressed empirically by administrative law
scholarship.27 One contribution of this Article, then, is to show that, in at
least one important context, a facially plausible intuition about behav-
ioral effects has led us astray. The broader implication, though, is that
this error could be pervasive in separation of powers jurisprudence and
scholarship more generally, as it is much easier to generate abstract
claims about agency incentives than it is to sustain a reasonable burden
of proof through empirical analysis.28 In short, a failure to check whether
24. See infra section IV.C.
25. See infra section IV.A.
26. See infra section IV.B.
27. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25
Yale J. on Reg. 85, 95 (2008) [hereinafter Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality] (describing a
“longstanding disjunction between the rhetoric and reality of regulatory reform” with
regard to reform’s effects on “delay and paralysis” in administrative agencies).
28. For a recent example of a court being persuaded by an argument that agency
structure violated separation of powers principles, see PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 6–8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that the structure of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutional in part because it is “an independent
agency headed by a single Director and not by a multi-member commission,” which
concentrates power in the one Director), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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theory accords with reality can create a grossly distorted understanding
of the effects of legal doctrine on administrative power.
Moreover, reckoning with administrative law’s linkages with agency
behavior also bears on perennial debates about the role of administrative
agencies within the American constitutional framework. 29 Formalist
separation of powers theory resists many aspects of the administrative
state because, as the argument goes, the administrative state often
involves the breakdown of hard lines demarcating the constitutionally
prescribed allocation of powers, which in turn creates dangerous
combinations of powers that misalign incentives in a manner inconsistent
with republican government. 30 The criticism leveled against Auer is
hardly the only manifestation of these larger concerns about vesting vari-
ous combinations of legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the
agencies that make up the administrative state. Indeed, claims about
these kinds of combinations—and the opportunities they create for the
“arrogation of power”31—are ubiquitous in contemporary criticisms of
the administrative state.32 But if agencies are often pulled in different
directions by competing doctrinal incentives and the inherent complex-
ities of their task—not to mention that they might be institutionally and
cognitively predisposed to err in predictable ways—then they are unlikely
to invariably seek to maximize their discretion and power, and the
formalist insistence on prophylactic divisions of powers to prevent agency
tyranny loses much of its persuasive force.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces Auer deference
and describes how it evolved from an earlier principle into a central fea-
ture of litigation in the federal courts in the 1990s. This Part also details
how Auer deference has more recently come under assault by some in the
judiciary and the academy. Part II then presents the critique of Auer in
greater detail, showing how the doctrine’s critics claim that it creates per-
verse incentives for rule writing by relaxing the strict separation of
rulemaking and rule-interpreting authority. That Part argues that the
debate over Auer has reached an impasse because neither proponents
nor critics have treated this claim as what it is: a testable empirical
hypothesis.
29. See infra notes 387–392 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 383–386 and accompanying text.
31. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
32. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1231, 1248 (1994) (noting that “[a]dministrative agencies routinely combine all three
governmental functions in the same body, and even in the same people within that
body”); id. at 1248–49 (describing the Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement cycle as
including the power to “promulgate[] substantive rules of conduct,” to “consider[]
whether to authorize investigations,” to conduct investigations, to file administrative
complaints, and to both prosecute and adjudicate the violation).
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Part III is the core of the Article. It provides an empirical linguistic
analysis of agency rule writing, showing statistically that Auer’s incentives
do not translate into any measurable changes in agencies’ propensity to
produce vague rules. I used computer-assisted text analysis methods,
some drawn from existing work in computational linguistics and psychol-
ogy, to measure different facets of textual vagueness for some 19 million
words of regulatory text from 1982 to 2016. This effort yielded nuanced,
variegated, and comprehensive data on agency rule-writing behavior that
I then used to test the self-delegation thesis. On these measures, Auer
shows no sign of having undermined clarity in rule writing.
Part IV then shows that the results in Part III find firm support in a
broader social science literature on individual and organizational deci-
sionmaking. If it were not for the prominence and influence of the
adherents of the self-delegation thesis, the results in Part III likely would
not come as any news. After all, an extensive body of social science
research points to cognitive and institutional tendencies that lead
administrative agencies to give primacy to providing clarity and specificity
in the here and now and to ignore any future purported benefits to the
agency that might come from crafting vague rules. These tendencies
reinforce and amplify the innumerable factors operating to induce clar-
ity in rule writing, including the immediate possibility of judicial review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, which administrative law
scholars widely accept as a threat that weighs heavily on agency officials’
minds in rulemaking.
Finally, the Article concludes with a discussion of the implications
that this analysis has for the ongoing assault on Auer and for larger
debates about the legitimacy of bureaucracy in a separation of powers
framework. Before changing the law in response to formalist concerns
about incentives, scholars and judges should insist that critics meet their
burden of demonstrating actual perverse effects.
I. AUER’S ORIGINS AND ASCENSION
Auer stands for the principle that an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.’”33 When courts apply Auer, they defer to an agency’s
33. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). In recent years, the Court has delineated
several circumstances when Auer does not apply. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (holding that Auer is not to be afforded “when there is
reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and
considered judgment’” (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462)); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243,
257 (2006) (holding that Auer does not apply when the rule’s text “parrots,” or mimics,
the legislative ambiguity that justified Chevron deference in the first place—something
widely known as the “anti-parroting” principle or canon). Together, these caveats have
prompted some to consider whether there is an emerging “step zero” in Auer doctrine.
See Clarke, supra note 17, at 189 (“But many of these doctrinal innovations do to Auer
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exercise of interpretive discretion. Reasonable interpretations are cred-
ited, even if the court might actually believe that another possible
interpretation is a better one.34 Auer is thus sometimes compared to its
more familiar doctrinal cousin, step two of Chevron deference,35 and in
some ways the comparison is apt—all the more so now that several
empirical studies have shown that the government’s win rate in Auer cases
is consistent with that in Chevron cases.36 Auer deference, like Chevron
deference, has been justified on a number of grounds, including that
interpretive deference broadly accords with notions of agencies as the
most expert and most accountable body to implement statutory pro-
grams.37
The difference between Chevron and Auer—and the impetus for the
bulk of the skepticism of Auer deference—lies in the source of the
interpretive discretion. With Chevron, the agency’s discretion, if it exists,
what United States v. Mead does to Chevron: they limit the ‘domain’ of deference by adding
what is often described as a ‘step zero.’”).
34. Decker, 568 U.S. at 613 (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need
not be the only possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”).
35. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“[T]he court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . . [I]f the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); see
also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 92 (2018)
(noting that Auer is often viewed as “a kind of Baby Chevron doctrine”).
36. Barmore, supra note 16, at 815 (“[C]ourts of appeals have responded to the
Court’s recent Auer decisions by narrowing their application of the doctrine, leading to a
steady decline from 2011 to 2014 in the rate at which courts grant Auer deference.”);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 515, 519 (2011) (finding a 76% valida-
tion rate for a set of cases decided by lower courts); William Yeatman, Note, An Empirical
Defense of Auer Step Zero, 106 Geo. L.J. 515, 547 (2018) (finding that, from 1993 to 2013,
the government won 74.4% of cases when a court invoked Auer and 68.6% when a court
invoked Chevron). These findings show a noticeable drop in actual deference compared
with the Supreme Court’s actual deference in the few Auer cases it has decided. According
to a leading empirical study, the Supreme Court applied Auer in 1.1% of agency inter-
pretation cases and deferred to the agency 90.9% of the time it applied Auer. William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1099 tbl.1
(2008). Thus, although Auer’s “controlling ‘unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation’” language might have suggested a kind of “super deference,” see Daniel
Mensher, Seminole Rock in Environmental Law: A Window into Weirdness, Yale J. on Reg.:
Notice & Comment (Sept. 15, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/seminole-rock-in-environmental-
law-a-window-into-weirdness-by-daniel-mensher/ [https://perma.cc/MJ8X-5ZCE] (“[W]hat I
find most perplexing about Auer is that it demands courts defer to nearly any agency
interpretation of its regulations, regardless of where, when, or how the agency offers that
interpretation. This leads to some bizarre results.”), Auer is in practice within the normal
range of the continuum of deference.
37. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1460 (describing a host of “prag-
matic arguments” for Auer, including “expertise, efficiency, flexibility, and accounta-
bility”); see also Clarke, supra note 17, at 179–81 (reviewing the evolution of justifications
of Auer).
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comes from Congress’s statutory delegation of authority, express or
implied.38 With Auer, the discretion comes from lingering ambiguities in
the agency’s own previously promulgated regulatory text.39 When Auer
comes up in litigation, it is most often because an agency has issued a
guidance, policy statement, advisory letter, or manual—that is, a
nonlegislative rule—that clarifies a legislative rule40 previously promul-
gated through notice-and-comment rulemaking under section 553 of the
APA.41 Usually, the agency could have made an identical change by
amending the initial rule through a new round of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, but issuing a guidance or other nonbinding document can
be accomplished more quickly because the strictures of section 553 do
38. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (noting that, even if
Congress has not “expressly delegated authority” to an agency, “it can still be apparent
from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law”). For a helpful
explication of Chevron, see Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1339, 1347–51 (2017) (discussing in detail the ways that Congress can delegate inter-
pretive questions to administrative agencies).
39. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (applying Seminole Rock rather than
Chevron because the “salary-basis” test at issue was “a creature of the Secretary’s own
regulations”).
40. The difference between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules is that legislative
rules “are designed to have binding legal effect on both the issuing agency and the public”
and are therefore required to “undergo the expensive and time-consuming process known
as notice-and-comment rulemaking before being promulgated.” David L. Franklin,
Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Shortcut, 120 Yale L.J. 276,
278 (2010) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c)(2012)). “Nonlegislative rules, by contrast, are not
meant to have binding legal effect, and are exempted from notice and comment by the
APA as either ‘interpretative rules’ or ‘general statements of policy.’” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(A)).
41. Of course, if the agency adds something too new, changing the substance of the
rule in a way that binds the public, it risks a procedural challenge under the APA alleging
that it should have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See, e.g., Texas v.
United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (enjoining the Department of
Homeland Security from implementing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program following a challenge from twenty-six U.S.
states that claimed DAPA had not been promulgated in compliance with the APA’s notice-
and-comment procedures), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d mem. by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam); Franklin, supra note 40, at 287–89
(discussing the various tests that courts employ in determining whether agency action is a
“legislative rule” that should have gone through notice-and-comment procedures).
Likewise, in certain cases an agency’s new interpretation in an enforcement context can
raise issues of fair notice that will prevent post hoc application of the interpretation. See,
e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (outlining the
“ascertainable certainty” requirement for fair notice in the enforcement realm (quoting
Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649
(5th Cir. 1976))).
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not apply.42 In effect, Auer blesses some procedural corner-cutting in the
name of administrative efficiency.43
Auer is not as widely cited as Chevron,44 but it has become an estab-
lished feature of litigation involving federal administrative agencies.45 It
was not always so. The first section of this Part chronicles the rise of Auer
deference from its humble origins in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.46
to its unquestioned endorsement by the Supreme Court in the late
1990s. The next section then turns to more recent years, which have seen
both an increasing acceptance of Auer deference across the federal
judiciary as well as some growing apprehension about the doctrine
among some current and former Supreme Court Justices.
A. Early Origins—The Road from Seminole Rock to Auer
Although the Supreme Court decided Auer in 1997, the deference
principle it represents actually stems from an unassuming case from the
1940s involving an interpretation issued by the Office of Price
Administration (OPA) of its General Maximum Price Regulation under
the Emergency Price Control Act.47 In Seminole Rock, the Court con-
fronted an ambiguity in this regulation, which provided that “each seller
shall charge no more than the prices which he charged during the
selected base period of March 1 to 31, 1942.”48 Seminole Rock & Sand
Company wanted to charge customers for crushed rock at a rate that it
had formally contracted for during the month of March, but which it had
not yet fulfilled.49 OPA believed that the “highest price charged” was to
be determined by reference to sales that had actually been delivered;
reference to contracted charges could be made only if there had been no
delivery in the month of March, which was not the case.50 In fact, at the
42. William Funk, Saving Auer, Jotwell (June 23, 2016) (reviewing Sunstein &
Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/saving-auer/
[https://perma.cc/K5RS-HCBX] (arguing that “it will be infinitely faster and easier for
the agency to use [interpretive rulemaking techniques]” because it would “avoid the
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA”).
43. See infra notes 104–111 and accompanying text for discussion of the advantages
of policymaking by nonlegislative rule.
44. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823, 824 n.2 (2006) (reporting that
Chevron was cited a staggering 2,414 times in its first decade, 2,584 times in its next six
years, and 2,235 times in the next five years).
45. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (“Questions of Seminole Rock and Auer deference arise as a matter of course
on a regular basis.”).
46. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
47. Id. at 411–14.
48. Id. at 413.
49. Id. at 412.
50. Id. at 415. The delivery that had been made was simply at a lower price than
Seminole Rock would have preferred. See id.
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same time it issued the General Maximum Price Regulation, OPA had
issued a “bulletin” in which it used the more precise “actually delivered”
language. 51 Siding with OPA, the Supreme Court stated that, in
interpreting an agency’s regulation, “the ultimate criterion is the admin-
istrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”52
Little has changed in the black letter formulation of this principle
between then and now.53 But, as several scholars have shown, it is not
clear that the Justices were aware that they were creating such an endur-
ing principle in administrative law with their decision in Seminole Rock.
Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski, for instance, argues that the “‘plainly
erroneous’ verbiage” from Seminole Rock originated as a product of a rela-
tively straightforward application of the Court’s Skidmore review,54 which
then morphed over the years into a standalone deference doctrine.55
Consistent with this conclusion, Seminole Rock only slowly caught on
over the first few decades after the decision. As Figure 1 makes clear, cita-
tions to Seminole Rock first ebbed through the 1950s and then began to
occur more regularly beginning in the 1960s. During this period, courts
began to demonstrate an increasing willingness to apply Seminole Rock’s
deference principle outside the price control context and to interpreta-
tions that were not “official.”56 In addition, whereas in the years immedi-
ately following Seminole Rock courts tended to “engage[] in what looked
like de novo interpretive analysis, only to cap off their decision with a
reference and citation to Seminole Rock,” courts in the 1960s “began to
articulate Seminole Rock as giving rise to a type of rebuttable presumption,
a burden that would have to be overcome if the court were to adopt a
51. Id. at 417.
52. Id. at 414.
53. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations is “under our jurisprudence, controlling unless
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’” (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))).
54. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that, even when
not controlling, an agency decision may be persuasive based on the “thoroughness evident
in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control”).
55. Pojanowski, supra note 35, at 88–89 (arguing that this evolution makes Auer bad
law in the sense that it misstates Seminole Rock’s true meaning); see also Aditya Bamzai,
Henry Hart’s Brief, Frank Murphy’s Draft, and the Seminole Rock Opinion, Yale J. on Reg.:
Notice & Comment (Sept. 12, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/henry-harts-brief-frank-
murphys-draft-and-the-seminole-rock-opinion-by-aditya-bamzai/ [https://perma.cc/UVD7-
E98U] (noting that the briefing in Seminole Rock seemed geared toward application of
Skidmore, not toward creation of a new deference doctrine).
56. See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of
Seminole Rock, 65 Emory L.J. 47, 69–70 (2015) [hereinafter Knudsen & Wildermuth,
Unearthing Lost History] (citing Boesche v. Udall, 303 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff’d,
373 U.S. 472 (1963)).
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contrary interpretation.”57 In the 1965 case Udall v. Tallman, the Supreme
Court gave Seminole Rock some added authority as a general administra-
tive law principle (rather than a provincial enclave of price-regulation
law)58 by “tying Seminole Rock to a broader body of well-accepted statutory
interpretation doctrines.”59
FIGURE 1: TOTAL CIRCUIT COURT CITATIONS TO AUER AND SEMINOLE ROCK,
1945–201660
These changes cultivated a steady, but quite limited, institutionaliza-
tion of Seminole Rock in the circuit courts through the 1970s, 1980s, and
early 1990s, as Figure 1 demonstrates. While average total citations to
Seminole Rock increased by more than 800% from the lowest period
(1955–1965) to the period just before Auer was decided in 1997 (1990–
1996), the frequency of citation remained low, averaging just twenty-one
citations per year from 1970 through 1996. And while the Supreme
57. Id. at 73–74.
58. 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
59. Knudsen & Wildermuth, Unearthing Lost History, supra note 56, at 78.
60. The data reported were obtained through Lexis Advance by searching for cita-
tions to the Shepard’s Citations footnotes concerning the principle of deference in both Auer
and Seminole Rock and aggregating the citations by type and by year. Total citations include
those defined by Shepard’s as neutral and routine citations. The vertical dashed line shows
the year 1997, when Auer was decided.
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Court occasionally cited Seminole Rock during the six years prior to 1997,
it did so without closely examining the doctrine.61
The principle’s low profile changed abruptly in 1997 with the
Court’s decision in Auer v. Robbins.62 In Auer, the question centered on
the lawfulness of the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of its “salary-
basis test” regulations63—a policy interpreting the Fair Labor Standards
Act’s exemption from entitlement to overtime pay for “bona fide execu-
tive, administrative, or professional” employees.64 Part of the salary-basis
test was whether an employee was subject to disciplinary reductions in
salary. If employees were “subject to” such requirements, they were not
salaried employees and, therefore, not exempt.65 The petitioners wanted
to be classified as nonexempt, nonsalaried employees because they were,
at least in theory, subject to disciplinary reductions in pay under their
employee manual.66 But in an amicus brief requested by the Court, the
Secretary of Labor argued that its salary-basis test required a showing of
“an actual practice of making such deductions or an employment policy
that creates a ‘significant likelihood’ of such deductions.”67 Characteriz-
ing the “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation’” language from Seminole Rock as a “deferential standard,” the
unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, concluded that
the Secretary’s interpretation was valid.68 The critical inquiry, in the
Court’s estimation, was whether the triggering language “subject to” in
61. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94–95 (1995) (“The
Secretary’s position . . . is a reasonable regulatory interpretation, and we must defer to
it.”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give
substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.”); Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (“[W]e presume
that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 358–59 (1989) (“This interpretation of the agency’s own regulation is not
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ and is thus controlling.” (quoting
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir.,
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159–60 (1987) (“The agency’s
interpretation . . . is deserving of substantial deference ‘unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation’ . . . .” (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414)); Lyng v.
Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (“[A]n agency’s construction of its own regulations is
entitled to substantial deference.”).
62. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Of course, as Figure 1 shows, citations to Seminole Rock itself
did not change much, but insofar as Auer enunciated much the same principle, there was
a significant change after 1997.
63. Id. at 454–55.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
65. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (describing the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of
the salary-basis test); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a) (2018).
66. Auer, 519 U.S. at 459–60.
67. Id. at 461 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance at 21, Auer, 519 U.S. 452 (No. 95-897), 1996 WL 595843).
68. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989)).
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the salary-basis regulations could support a more restrictive interpreta-
tion that would preclude the mere technical possibility of disciplinary
reductions from preventing application of the Fair Labor Standards Act
exemption.69 To this, the Court replied that the words “comfortably
bear[] the meaning the Secretary assigns.”70 Nor did the fact that the
interpretation was contained only in a brief filed in the litigation sway the
Court’s conclusion that Seminole Rock demanded deference to the
Secretary’s interpretation.71
With the unanimous decision in Auer, the Supreme Court clarified
that, whatever it had once meant, Seminole Rock now required substantial
deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. The
Secretary of Labor’s interpretation was hardly inevitable, and its justifica-
tion was far from a paragon of transparent reasoning, but that interpreta-
tion was nonetheless entitled to deference because it was not specifically
foreclosed by the regulatory text. As can be seen in Figure 1, this strong
statement about the scope of the long-standing Seminole Rock principle
led to a substantial increase in total citations to the doctrine. Total citations
to Auer and Seminole Rock rose by 330% in 1997; positive citations likewise
rose by over 2,300%. After Auer, it became possible to describe the princi-
ple as a “full-blown and widely applied ‘axiom of judicial review.’”72
B. Recent Developments—Auer’s Second Revolution
Between 1997 and 2005, citations to Auer and Seminole Rock
remained stable and overwhelmingly favorable to the doctrine, with total
citations averaging about sixty-seven per year for the period, explicitly
positive citations holding at about fifteen per year, and negative citations
remaining rare, at about two per year. Beginning in 2006, however,
Auer/Seminole Rock deference experienced a second revolution. Total
citations essentially doubled from 2006 to 2016. Much of this increase is
actually attributable to the growth of positive treatments of the doctrine:
Positive citations to Auer and Seminole Rock doubled over this period. But
some of the change appears to be driven by growing concern about the
doctrine, too, with the courts quadrupling the average yearly rate of
explicitly negative treatments during this period.
69. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a).
70. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
71. Id. at 462.
72. Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Lessons from the Lost History of
Seminole Rock, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 647, 648 (2015) (quoting Allen M. Campbell Co.
Gen. Contractors v. Lloyd Wood Const. Co, 446 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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FIGURE 2: CIRCUIT COURTS’ NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE CITATIONS TO AUER
AND SEMINOLE ROCK, 1995–201673
The impetus behind this second revolution was a series of Supreme
Court cases giving greater attention—sometimes sharply critical—to the
doctrine. First, in early 2006, the Court decided Gonzales v. Oregon, hold-
ing that the Attorney General’s interpretive rule prohibiting the use of
controlled substances in carrying out otherwise state-sanctioned assisted
suicides was invalid under the terms of the Controlled Substances Act.74
Although the Court nominally reaffirmed the validity of the Auer doc-
trine, it ultimately concluded that the doctrine was “inapplicable”
because “the underlying regulation [did] little more than restate the
terms of the statute itself.”75 By endorsing a new “anti-parroting princi-
ple,” the Gonzales decision suggested for the first time that there might be
a “step zero”76 requiring that certain criteria be fulfilled before an agency’s
73. The data reported were obtained through Lexis Advance by searching for cita-
tions to the Shepard’s Citations footnotes concerning the principle of deference in both Auer
and Seminole Rock and aggregating the citations by type and by year. The vertical dashed
line shows the year 1997, when Auer was decided.
74. 546 U.S. 243, 274–75 (2006); see also id. at 249 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971
(2012)).
75. Id. at 256–57.
76. Scholars often refer to a somewhat analogous “Chevron step zero,” where courts
consider whether certain criteria—namely, whether Congress has expressly or implicitly
delegated authority to the agency to make rules with the force of law—are met before even
applying Chevron’s two steps. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
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interpretation could be afforded Auer deference. The case drew little
attention from observers at the time, but in light of subsequent devel-
opments, it is clear that the Court’s power to “simply invent[] an
exception to Auer” 77 undermined the stability of the doctrine and
opened the door to more concerted questioning by federal courts.78
It was not until six years later, however, that any of the Justices explic-
itly broached the possibility of jettisoning Auer deference. In 2011, the
Court in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. afforded Auer
deference to the interpretation that the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) advanced of its regulations governing what kinds of
access to transmission facilities incumbent telecommunications providers
must give to competitors.79 The majority was satisfied that there was “no
danger that deferring to the Commission would effectively ‘permit the
agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a
new regulation,’”80 nor was there “any other ‘reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment
on the matter in question.’”81 In a concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed that
FCC’s interpretation of the regulation controlled, but only because it was
“the fairest reading of the orders in question.”82 With respect to Auer
deference, Justice Scalia indicated that he had come to have second
thoughts about the doctrine since his opinion for a unanimous Court in
Auer—a change of heart that some have observed created “widespread
confusion” in the circuits.83 Justice Scalia argued that, upon further
Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 873 (2001) (describing “step zero” as “the inquiry that courts
should undertake before moving on to step one of Chevron, or turning instead to Skidmore
(or resolving the issue de novo)”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187,
191 (2006) (describing the “step zero” inquiry as the “inquiry into whether the Chevron
framework applies at all”).
77. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 365
(2006).
78. See Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But for How Long?): Justice
Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1,
3 (2007) (suggesting that “Gonzales seemed to signal a shift away from Auer deference for
an agency’s interpretations of its regulations”). Professor Stephen Johnson noted two
other cases, however, that signaled vitality for the doctrine. Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
551 U.S. 158 (2007)). One might add Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council to the list of cases that signaled the Court was still not quite fully convinced of the
dangers of Auer. 557 U.S. 261, 274–75 (2009). The case involved an interpretation of EPA’s
regulation determining which agency, EPA or the Army Corps of Engineers, had authority
to issue a fill permit under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 265–66. The Court cited Auer in
holding that EPA’s interpretation was acceptable. Id. at 274–75.
79. 564 U.S. 50, 53 (2011).
80. Id. at 63 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
81. Id. at 63–64 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
82. Id. at 67–68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of
the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 Admin. L. Rev.
787, 832 (2014).
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reflection, it is “contrary to fundamental principles of separation of pow-
ers to permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well,”
and doing so in fact “encourages the agency to enact vague rules which
give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.”84
Justice Scalia’s about-face, and his theoretically driven argument that
Auer has perverse effects on rule writing, provided a strong signal of
growing discontent with the doctrine.85 Over the next few years, the
depth of that discontent among the Court’s other Justices began to reveal
itself. First, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Court clarified
another requirement in Auer’s emerging “step zero”: that the agency’s
interpretation cannot be one that creates a risk of “unfair surprise,”86
whether because it “conflicts with a prior interpretation” or because it
appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position.’”87
Echoing Justice Scalia’s Talk America concurrence, Justice Alito’s majority
opinion in Christopher invoked the self-delegation thesis but declined to
reach the question of whether the doctrine ought to be discarded.88 The
next term, the Court took its most serious collective look at the doctrine
to date in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.89 Justice Scalia
penned a partial dissent to the application of Auer deference, urging his
colleagues to recognize that “enough is enough.”90 Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justice Alito, also authored a concurring opinion that acknowl-
edged their reticence about Auer,91 but for the time, the emerging coali-
tion against Auer again declined to force the issue, preferring to “await a
case in which the issue is properly raised and argued.”92 Finally, although
the question in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n only tangentially raised
questions related to Auer, most of the Court’s conservatives again laid out
their concerns with Auer in separate opinions.93
84. Talk America, 564 U.S. at 68–69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. See Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 Geo. L.J. 943, 955 (2017)
[hereinafter Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock] (describing the concurrence as “the first shot”
in the assault on Auer).
86. 567 U.S. 142, 155–56 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Long
Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007)).
87. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)).
88. Id. at 158–59 (“Our practice of deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulations . . . creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-
ended regulations that they can later interpret as they see fit . . . .”).
89. 568 U.S. 597 (2013).
90. Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 615 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“It may be appropriate to reconsider [Auer
deference] in an appropriate case.”).
92. Id. at 616.
93. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“I await a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be explored
through full briefing and argument.”); id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“By supplementing the APA with judge-made doctrines of deference, we have
revolutionized the import of interpretive rules’ exemption from notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Agencies may now use these rules not just to advise the public, but also to
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Prior to its grant of certiorari in Kisor v. Wilkie,94 the Court had
several opportunities to take up cases that would have squarely presented
the question of whether to overturn Auer. Until now, however, the
Justices in favor of revisiting Auer had not appeared to have the necessary
votes.95 First, amidst a maelstrom of speculation that the Supreme Court
would grant a petition for writ of certiorari in United Student Aid Funds
precisely to overturn Auer, the Court instead denied the petition over a
vigorous dissent from the denial by Justice Thomas.96 Then, after the
Fourth Circuit ruled that a school district had to allow a transgender
student to use the bathroom matching his gender identity, citing and
deferring to a Department of Education guidance,97 the Supreme Court
received a petition for certiorari squarely requesting that the Court
abandon Auer. In a surprising development, the Court granted this
petition, but not on the question of whether Auer should be overruled,98
prompting speculation that the Court would at most narrow Auer
deference. 99 Even that possibility evaporated—at least for the time
bind them.”); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning “the
legitimacy of our precedents requiring deference to administrative interpretations of
regulations”).
94. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
95. It is reasonably clear that the confirmation of Justice Kavanaugh will change the
math. Although he never had occasion to weigh in on Auer deference in a live case during
his time as a circuit judge, overall, he appears to be a deference skeptic. See Christopher
Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of Powers (Corrected),
SCOTUSblog (July 26, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-
administrative-law-and-separation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/3FD3-4NAR] (“Although
Kavanaugh has not addressed the propriety of Auer deference . . . , his concerns about
interpretive doctrines that turn on ambiguity, coupled with his views on separation of
powers, seem to suggest he would be receptive to calls to eliminate—or at least further
limit—Auer deference.”). In extrajudicial remarks before his nomination, Justice
Kavanaugh opined that Justice Scalia’s dissent in Decker had “eviscerated” Auer deference
and predicted that “some day Auer will be overruled, and that Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Decker will be the law of the land.” Adam K. Lasky & Daniel Radthorne, Why Judge
Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Could Be Good News for Government Contractors, Procurement
Playbook (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.procurementplaybook.com/2018/09/why-judge-
kavanaughs-confirmation-could-be-good-news-for-government-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/
MT34-E4YY]. That outcome appears to be in Justice Kavanaugh’s hands now.
96. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
97. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
98. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.)
(granting certiorari to only two of the three questions presented by the petition); see also
Amy Howe, Court Adds Five New Cases, Including Transgender Bathroom Dispute, to
Docket, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/court-adds-
five-new-cases-including-transgender-bathroom-dispute-to-docket/ [https://perma.cc/WPF6-
L5TG] (“In granting review today, the justices sidestepped the most prominent issue they
had been asked to take on: whether they should overrule their decision in Auer, which has
been the target of criticism by conservative lawyers and jurists.”).
99. See Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court to Hear Transgender Bathroom Case,
Wash. Post: The Volokh Conspiracy (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/10/28/supreme-court-to-hear-transgender-bathroom-
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being—when the Trump Administration withdrew the guidance at issue,
prompting the Supreme Court to return the case to the Fourth Circuit.100
The effect of this second wave of Auer cases, as the data in Figure 1
show, has not been to stanch the flow of citations to Auer ; it has seem-
ingly been to bring Auer to unprecedented prominence.101 At the same
time, the data show that the federal judiciary is becoming deeply divided
about the desirability of the doctrine, and at least some of the Justices on
the Court are clearly interested in revisiting Auer.102 The Court is poised
to do so this term in Kisor.103 The next Part of the Article examines the
source of the deep disagreement developing in the federal courts: a theo-
retical argument about Auer’s behavioral incentives.
II. AUER’S PERVERSE INCENTIVES
The principle of deference to agency interpretations of regulations
serves a fundamental purpose in administrative law.104 Whenever there is
rulemaking, there is an inescapable need for expert application of those
rules to increasingly fine-grained, unforeseen situations that fall within
the purview of the rules105—even the most perspicacious of rule writers
cannot anticipate every circumstance that might require application of a
case/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“If Auer and Seminole Rock are to be reconsid-
ered, it will not be in this case.”).
100. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239 (2017)
(mem.) (vacating and remanding the case to the Fourth Circuit “in light of the guidance
document issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice”); see also
Amy Howe, Justices Send Transgender Bathroom Case Back to Lower Courts, No Action on
Same-Sex Marriage Cake Case, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2017/03/justices-send-transgender-bathroom-case-back-lower-courts/ [https://perma.cc/
AQV8-KYJ3].
101. See supra Figure 1.
102. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104. See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 49, 92–93 (2000)
(citing leading administrative law treatises endorsing Seminole Rock “as ‘based on common
sense’” and noting that the Court often treated the rationale for deference as “self-evident”
(quoting 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.10,
at 282 (3d ed. 1994))); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that Auer deference presents issues “going to the heart
of administrative law”).
105. The literature identifies two somewhat related bases for deference to agency
interpretations: First, agencies are in the best position to resolve ambiguities according to
the “regulative intent.” See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1456; Sunstein &
Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 306–07. Second, agencies have exper-
tise that allows them to more coherently “resolve any gaps, conflicts, or ambiguities” in the
regulatory scheme. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1456. For a general account
of the unique challenges of regulatory interpretation, as opposed to statutory interpre-
tation, see Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 365–77 (2012).
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rule.106 It is for precisely this reason that the APA provides for avenues
other than notice-and-comment rulemaking, such as nonlegislative rule-
making.107 It would be highly inefficient to require every needed clari-
fication or interpretation to be formulated as an amendment to a rule—
even as it would increase accountability to do so—yet that is what would
be encouraged by deferring to rules and not to interpretations of rules.
In essence, Auer deference attempts to balance out pragmatically a classic
tension in administration—namely, “accommodating the need for agency
flexibility while guarding against the specter of what Justice Jackson
memorably described as ‘administrative authoritarianism’—the ‘power to
decide without law.’”108
Auer vindicates core values of administrative flexibility and efficiency
by giving rule writers some assurance that their agency’s good-faith
application of the codified regulatory text to novel, but related, problems
will be respected by the courts, in part because of the recognition that
agencies are hardly inexpert when it comes to determining the intended
meaning and purpose of regulatory text they drafted themselves.109 In
doing so, Auer gives agencies greater freedom to avoid undergoing
cumbersome notice-and-comment rulemaking whenever they seek to
make these adjustments.110 Some might quibble with the precise balance
106. Nor do they necessarily want to. See Barmore, supra note 16, at 819 (“An agency
could try to answer every potential interpretive question, but such clarity would increase
the length and complexity of regulations until they were too opaque for regulated parties
to understand.”).
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012) (describing nonlegislative rulemaking); id. § 554
(describing formal adjudication); see also Franklin, supra note 40, at 303–04 (highlighting
the benefits of nonlegislative rulemaking, including the relief it grants to resource-
strapped agencies that might otherwise be forced to undergo cumbersome notice-and-
comment rulemaking).
108. Clarke, supra note 17, at 178 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 216
(1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) (describing these as “two classic concerns of the modern
administrative state”); see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1453 (“[W]hole-
sale rejection of Seminole Rock would be quite disruptive, and would likely have serious
disadvantages, including loss of regulatory flexibility and efficiency.”).
109. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–
53 (1991) (“Because the Secretary promulgates these standards, the Secretary is in a better
position than is the Commission to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations in ques-
tion.”). Indeed, some scholars have argued that agencies’ unique ability to interpret regu-
latory texts is a reason for making Auer deference “more robust than Chevron deference.”
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1454–57 (acknowledging the argument but
noting that it has been replaced by an ascendant “pragmatic” rationale analogous to the
rationale for Chevron); see also Angstreich, supra note 104, at 92–93 (citing sources mak-
ing the argument).
110. See Barmore, supra note 16, at 819–20 (“Auer allows agencies to apply their rules
to unanticipated situations that fall within the interstices of the regulatory language.”). It
bears noting, however, that agencies are apparently quite involved in revisiting existing
rules through legislative rulemaking. As Professor Wendy Wagner and colleagues show,
notwithstanding how cumbersome notice-and-comment rulemaking might be, agencies
commonly make these workaday adjustments through this channel. Wendy Wagner et al.,
Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 183, 202, 211 (2017) [hereinafter Wagner et al.,
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struck by Auer, arguing that more interpretations should be made in the
form of notice-and-comment rulemaking.111 But these arguments, like
arguments against the Court’s hands-off approach to the nondelegation
doctrine, fail to persuade because they fail to explain why accountability
must always be maximized at the expense of efficiency and flexibility.
The growing skepticism of Auer from vocal members of the federal
judiciary, as detailed in section I.B, does not rely primarily on a fruitless
second-guessing of the need for agency flexibility. Instead, the skeptical
treatments from some Justices in cases like Talk America, Decker,
Christopher, and Perez rely on a theoretical apprehension about the doc-
trine’s incentives for rule writing. That is—according to Manning, who
largely inspired the recent judicial questioning of the doctrine112—Auer
has an “untoward effect upon [the agency’s] incentive to speak precisely
and transparently when it promulgates regulations.”113 It is that appre-
hension that the Article now turns to in more detail.
A. The Critique of Auer—Incentives for Self-Delegation
Auer deference differs fundamentally from other deference doc-
trines in administrative law that concern statutory interpretations by
agencies. With a doctrine like Chevron, the agency itself has no control
over the scope of the discretion embedded in the raw statutory text, and
Congress retains no power to limit the exercise of interpretive discretion
after the fact except through further legislation.114 This institutional
allocation of law-writing and law-interpreting authority means that
“Congress’s incentive is to speak as clearly as possible on the matters it
regards as important,”115 substantially limiting the scope of agencies’
interpretive authority. In contrast, with Auer, there is a fusion of legislative
Dynamic Rulemaking] (estimating, based on the authors’ sample, that agencies revised
73% of rules at least once and engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking for one-third
of those revisions).
111. See Funk, supra note 42 (arguing that Auer plays a role in encouraging agencies
to “cut corners” by adopting interpretive rules instead of amending rules through notice-
and-comment rulemaking and that this occurs with sufficient regularity to justify some
change to the doctrine).
112. See Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, supra note 85, at 954 (noting that “Manning’s
analysis appears to have played a considerable role in flipping Justice Scalia’s views” on
Auer); see also Leske, supra note 83, at 790.
113. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 655 (1996) [hereinafter Manning,
Constitutional Structure]. For a more generalized critique of the perverse incentives that
regulation by guidance creates, see Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court’s
Deferences—A Foolish Inconsistency, Admin. & Reg. L. News, Fall 2000, at 10, 11.
114. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the imple-
mentation of an executive agency, it has no control over that implementation (except, of
course, through further, more precise, legislation).”).
115. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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and interpretative authority within the same institution.116 Agencies write
rules in one breath and interpret or enforce those rules in another.
Affording deference to regulatory interpretations, as Auer does, makes
agencies authoritative as to the meaning of regulatory text they have
previously written.
According to critics, this distinction makes all the difference and
renders Auer highly suspect.117 Because it “allows an agency to both write
the law (the regulation) and determine its application,”118 Auer defer-
ence creates the possibility that agencies will seek to maximize their
interpretive discretion by writing vague, underspecified regulatory text in
the first instance.119 That is, “[r]egulatory ambiguity, unlike statutory
ambiguity, does not entail an implicit delegation to another institution”—
and that difference “makes such ambiguity relatively more attractive.”120
Recall the Title IX example: Instead of bearing the cost of specifying
its meaning ex ante, as Auer critics claim it would have been more likely
to do if another actor had the ultimate interpretive authority, the
Department of Education allegedly had no incentive to specify in its rule
how it would like to treat transgender students with regard to bathroom
choice. Under Auer, Manning notes, “if an agency issues an imprecise or
vague regulation, it does so secure in the knowledge that it can insist
upon an unobvious interpretation, so long as its choice is not ‘plainly
erroneous.’”121 In other words, an agency could simply leave more discre-
tion for itself on the front end, when writing a rule, and leave for another
day the task of specifying its meaning, as courts applying Auer will simply
defer to any plausible construction of capacious or underspecified
language.
116. See id.
117. This argument is often cast in terms of formalist separation of powers logic, see
id. at 619 (arguing that there could be “no congressional implication that the agency can
resolve ambiguities in its own regulations” because “that would violate a fundamental
principle of separation of powers—that the power to write a law and the power to
interpret it cannot rest in the same hands”), but it is ultimately based on, and influential
because of, a consequentialist claim about the dangers of self-delegation that inhere in a
breakdown of the strict separation of powers, see Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly understandable, of course,
for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and
allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through
the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”).
118. Barmore, supra note 16, at 817.
119. Decker, 568 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[W]hen an agency interprets its own rules—that is something else. Then the power to
prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret; and the incentive is to speak vaguely
and broadly, so as to retain a ‘flexibility’ that will enable ‘clarification’ with retroactive
effect.”).
120. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1461 (emphasis added).
121. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 113, at 657 (emphasis added by
Manning) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
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Taken to its logical endpoint, the argument is not merely that Auer
eliminates the incentive to speak with clarity but that it actually creates an
incentive to “maximize” opacity.122 When agencies consider making pol-
icy by nonlegislative rule (that is, by guidance document, policy state-
ment, and the like), the most important parameter to consider is how
much risk there is that the interpretation will stretch the meaning of the
regulatory text too far, such that a reviewing court would reject that
interpretation.123 But because agencies have control over the regulatory
text as well as the interpretation, this key parameter is actually under
their control in the Auer context. Agencies could promulgate texts that
are so vague that virtually any interpretations would be at least arguably
consistent with them. The optimal strategy, critics charge, would amount
to a type of regulatory sandbagging: deliberately withhold some clarity
now in order to augment flexibility down the road.124 Indeed, critics
might speculate that agencies could even subvert the statutes they are
administering by first translating statutory language into vague terms,
and then retranslating that translation into the agency’s preferred mean-
ing. As Justice Scalia argued in Decker, if Auer functions in this way, then
the doctrine gives to agencies a “dangerous permission slip for the
arrogation of power.”125 For Manning, the danger of self-delegation
inherent in any breakdown of the strict separation of rule-writing and
rule-interpreting authority is sufficiently serious that it justifies a constitu-
tional presumption against any institution or doctrine with that feature.126
The key prediction of the self-delegation thesis, then, is that agencies
operating in a world with Auer deference will systemically underspecify the
122. Barmore, supra note 16, at 818 (“If Auer requires deference to an agency’s
interpretation of ambiguous (but not unambiguous) regulations, agencies would
maximize future flexibility and power by promulgating ambiguous regulations. . . . Critics
worry that the incentive to promulgate vague regulations would lead to predictably more
ambiguous regulations . . . .”); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra
note 16, at 308 (explaining Auer critics’ concern that agencies “will issue vague, broad
regulations, knowing full well that when the time comes, they will be able to impose the
interpretation they prefer”).
123. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1395–96 (2004) (exploring how an agency’s choice of regulatory form
will impact the judicial review that its policy will receive).
124. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, supra note 85, at 955 (“[W]hen agencies
promulgate regulations that do not tackle the hard problems, the agency does not ‘pay’
upfront, and when the agency later issues an interpretative rule to tackle those problems—
even though interpretative rules are not subject to the same rigorous procedure—the
agency does not ‘pay later’ either.” (citing Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at
1464)).
125. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
126. See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 113, at 631; see also Anthony
& Asimow, supra note 113, at 10 (arguing that the Auer doctrine violates separation of
powers principles because “[i]t authorizes the agencies to make law through an informal
format where Congress has not delegated such power either explicitly or by implication”).
112 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:85
rules they write relative to a counterfactual world where Auer does not
exist.127 That is, whereas under ordinary circumstances, agencies would
balance various considerations to settle on some kind of “optimal” level
of rule precision,128 Auer would seem to promise a greater payoff for
writing a relatively vague rule, and in fact could be thought to shift base-
line rule-writing styles across the board. With vague rule texts, it is far
easier for agencies to cut corners. They can avoid notice-and-comment
rulemaking and make major policy changes by issuing guidance docu-
ments, policy statements, opinion letters, and the like instead, as they
may be more naturally inclined to do anyway.129 Notice-and-comment
procedures can be costly and time-consuming.130 Indeed, by one study’s
estimation, the average time to complete notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing is between one and three years.131 In contrast, agencies can, in princi-
ple, issue a nonlegislative rule in a matter of days, as there is no pre-
scribed procedure in the APA for such actions.132 The cost savings on the
127. Some have also argued that agencies would have incentives to issue more
nonlegislative rules than they otherwise would because of the availability of Auer. See
Funk, supra note 42. On the margins, this may be true, although it is always the case that
agencies have strong incentives to cut corners around notice-and-comment rulemaking
regardless of the level of deference. Whether Auer makes a difference in this calculation is
an open question (and one that deserves further research), but the existing evidence is,
notably, inconsistent with the notion that there has been an explosion of significant
guidance (relative to significant rulemaking) in recent decades. See Connor N. Raso,
Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 Yale L.J.
782, 813–15 (2010) (finding that significant guidances make up a negligible percentage of
agency work and are often used to “clarify highly technical details”).
128. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65, 71–
72 (1983) (arguing that such an “optimal” approach would require a normative balancing
of various factors, including “transparency, accessibility, and congruence”); see also Adam
I. Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 1321,
1327–28 (2016) (arguing that much legal uncertainty is irreducible and that agencies bal-
ance many factors in designing regulatory programs).
129. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators
and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in
Regulating Hazardous Waste, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1994, at 111, 127
(theorizing that strategic agencies might choose to regulate by guidance as a means of
avoiding the costs of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
130. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Getting Back to the Basics with Agency Rulemaking, Reg.
Rev. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/13/kovacs-basics-agency-
rulemaking/ [https://perma.cc/RYM9-V27W] (“Although scholars argue about why the
rulemaking process is ossifying and how much it is happening, there is little debate that
rulemaking is a big pain for federal agencies.”).
131. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of
the Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889, 958–59 (2008) [hereinafter
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking] (“The average duration of completed
rulemakings, both significant and more routine, for the ten agencies in Charts 5 and 6
ranged from 243.74 days for the [Department of Commerce] to 760.93 days for the
[Department of Health and Human Services].”).
132. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). Executive actions have added some
procedural gloss. For instance, the Office of Management and Budget issued a bulletin
during the George W. Bush Administration encouraging agencies to develop standard
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back end can literally be accounted for in the decision about how specific
to be on the front end.
B. The Defense of Auer
Although the self-delegation critique of Auer has been quite influen-
tial, both in the courts and in the academy, a few voices supportive of the
doctrine have emerged. Recently, Sunstein and Vermeule addressed the
tenuous assumptions behind the separation of powers critique of Auer.133
They note that, strictly speaking, agencies are not engaged in legislating
or adjudicating when they engage in rule writing and rule interpretation,
respectively. Rather, they are engaged in executing the law.134 This task,
with its mix of legislative and expository authority, is pervasive in the
administrative state.135 Thus, the self-delegation argument that critics
make against Auer has far-reaching implications not just for agency rule
writing, but also for the majority of actions agencies undertake. 136
Indeed, Sunstein and Vermeule argue that such an amalgam of institu-
tional functions is so common in the modern administrative state that
those who advance a formalistic critique of Auer bear a heavy burden of
explaining why Auer must go but modern administrative agencies may
stay.137 Others have noted that Auer is part of a fragile equilibrium;
procedures for the issuance of significant guidance documents. See Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Bull. No. 07-02, Final Bulletin for Agency
Good Guidance Practices (2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
omb/memoranda/2007/m07-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/CVK3-GKVZ].
133. Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 310 (discussing
the separation of powers critique—which suggests that it involves a “constitutionally
suspect combination of the power to make law with the power to interpret law”—and
rejecting that critique as “both unsound and too sweeping”).
134. Id. at 311 (“When agencies make rules and interpret law in the course of
exercising their statutory grant of authority, they are carrying out or completing a
legislative plan . . . .”); see also Jack L. Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s
Completion Power, 115 Yale L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) (defining the “completion power” as
“the President’s authority to prescribe incidental details needed to carry into execution a
legislative scheme, even in the absence of any congressional authorization to complete
that scheme”).
135. See Lawson, supra note 32, at 1248 (discussing the extensive enforcement
activities of a typical federal agency).
136. Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative
State 78 (2016) [hereinafter Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation] (“If the combination of
lawmaking and law-interpreting functions in agencies really is constitutionally suspect as
such, then there are much larger problems than Auer to discuss.”); Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Auer, Now and Forever, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment (Sept. 19,
2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-now-and-forever-by-cass-r-sunstein-adrian-vermeule/
[https://perma.cc/V6KA-7X6F] [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Now and Forever]
(“The constitutional critique of Auer rests on generalities about the separation of
lawmaking from law-execution and law-interpretation. If those generalities were applied
consistently, however, they would require declaring unconstitutional dozens of major
federal agencies exercising combined functions.”).
137. Sunstein & Vermeule, Now and Forever, supra note 136.
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change the ground rules, and different and potentially worse incentives
might take hold. For instance, Professor Aaron Nielson argues that one
possible effect of overturning or watering down the Auer doctrine would
be to discourage agencies from writing rules in the first place, instead
using their prerogative under the Chenery doctrine to make policy itera-
tively through ad hoc adjudication.138 If the concern about Auer is in part
about its failure to deliver fair notice and public accountability, a world in
which agencies avoid prospective rulemaking in favor of retrospective
and often-piecemeal adjudication would be a decidedly worse one. More-
over, some have argued that the likely result of overturning Auer and
handing interpretive authority to courts would be to greatly undermine
clarity in the law.139 Instead of having agencies announce one authorita-
tive (albeit ephemeral) interpretation, there would likely be circuit splits
about the proper interpretation of important regulatory provisions,
thereby increasing the costs of compliance for regulated entities.140 Then
there is the fact that overturning Auer might throw the validity of count-
less existing interpretations, many of which have induced substantial reli-
ance interests, into question.141
These arguments, as persuasive as they might be, elide the central
question in the debate over Auer : that is, the self-delegation thesis.
Indeed, the response to the self-delegation thesis itself has been strikingly
muted. Responding to the self-delegation thesis, Auer’s rehabilitators
have generally thought it sufficient to point out what Manning antici-
pated142—that there are cross-cutting incentives that actually encourage
clarity in rule writing.143 Agencies gain greater assurance that regulated
138. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, supra note 85, at 948 (noting that, under the
Chenery doctrine, “agencies can choose to interpret the statutes they administer by promul-
gating rules or, if they prefer, by simply enforcing the statutes directly through case-by-case
adjudication”). Nielson argues that Auer’s infusion of back-end flexibility makes rule-
making more attractive, with attendant benefits for notice of legal obligations even if gaps
remain to be interpreted. Id. at 948–50. But if Auer were “off the table, agencies may rely
more often on Chenery” and make policy in an iterative, unpredictable fashion through
adjudication. Id. at 948.
139. See Derek A. Woodman, Rethinking Auer Deference: Agency Regulations and
Due Process Notice, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1721, 1736 (2014) (noting the “disuniformity
that could result if courts were to substitute the agency’s interpretation of the regulation
with their own”).
140. See id.
141. Clarke, supra note 17, at 193 (noting that there are substantial reliance interests
in interpretive rules and that virtually every interpretation under the APA would be
affected in some way since Seminole Rock predated the APA).
142. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 113, at 655–56 (anticipating that
“an agency may have various other reasons to draft clear, self-limiting rules, even when it
possesses the right of self-interpretation,” including keeping enforcement costs low, main-
taining hierarchical control of agency staff, and binding future administrations).
143. Sunstein & Vermeule, Now and Forever, supra note 136 (“And there is a cross-
cutting incentive as well: agencies who want to bind their own successors, perhaps because
a change of administration looms, are better off creating a binding rule, repealable only
through the same relatively costly process.”).
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entities will comply with the law, as the agency understands it, when they
craft with clarity their understanding of a legislative rule.144 Likewise,
both agencies and regulated entities benefit from certainty against future
changes when issues are settled in legislative rules rather than in later
guidance documents or policy statements,145 as rules can be formally
changed only through a new legislative rule.146 Citing these cross-cutting
incentives, Sunstein and Vermeule argue that Auer’s critics have commit-
ted what they call the “sign fallacy”—“identify[ing] the likely sign of an
effect and then . . . declar[ing] victory, without examining its magnitude”
and “without asking whether it is realistic to think that the effect will be
significant.”147
Some commentators have also noted that there is an absence of the
kind of circumstantial evidence that we would expect if the self-delega-
tion theory had any power. For instance, no former agency general coun-
sel has come forward to say that any rule has been deliberately obfus-
cated in response to the incentives.148 Quite to the contrary, when
Professor Christopher Walker asked agency rule drafters what they
thought about Auer, one respondent answered, “I personally would
attempt to avoid issuing ambiguous regulations that we would then have
to interpret.”149 Such sentiments are widely shared among regulators.150
Indeed, as Walker further shows, most agency rule writers are apparently
generally unaware of the doctrine, at least relative to other administrative
law doctrines, such as Chevron deference.151
144. See Diver, supra note 128, at 72 (arguing that clarity in regulations can streamline
enforcement, or perhaps even make it less necessary if regulated entities can be relied on
to comply).
145. See Anthony, supra note 17, at 1317 (noting the confusion and uncertainty that
can result when agencies rely on guidances and policy statements rather than on legislative
rules).
146. See Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 234
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that an “agency issuing a legislative rule is itself bound by the rule
until that rule is amended or revoked”).
147. Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 299–300.
148. Ronald M. Levin, Auer and the Incentives Issue, Yale J. on Reg.: Notice & Comment
(Sept. 19, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-and-the-incentives-issue-by-ronald-m-levin/
[https://perma.cc/WCJ7-LWC2] (“When I refer to [the lack of] evidence, I do not mean
to insist on specific case citations or empirical studies. As yet, however, the critics of Auer
have not even produced any good anecdotes to support their theory.”).
149. Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan. L. Rev.
999, 1065 (2015) [hereinafter Walker, Statutory Interpretation] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
150. See, e.g., Aditi Prabhu, How Does Auer Deference Influence Agency Practices?,
Admin. & Reg. L. News, Winter 2015, at 11, 12 (“[A]gencies have a strong interest in
writing clear regulations. Agencies can effectively enforce only clear regulations; otherwise,
they risk running afoul of fair notice and due process considerations.”).
151. See Walker, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 149, at 1019 fig.1 (reporting
survey data showing that only 53% of agency rule drafters knew of Auer/Seminole Rock
deference by name, whereas 94% knew of Chevron deference by name). The same study
revealed that only 39% of agency rule drafters actually claimed to use Auer/Seminole Rock
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In sum, the response to the self-delegation critique has been to say
that there is a “palpable lack of realism” and “lack of empirical ground-
ing” behind the self-delegation thesis.152 But, notably, Auer’s rehabilita-
tors have not offered any empirical analysis of their own to test the self-
delegation thesis or assess the strength of any cross-cutting incentives
they postulate. Instead, the response to the self-delegation thesis has
been to make an argument based on empirical agnosticism.153
C. The Need for Evidence in Assessing the Self-Delegation Critique
Despite the efforts of Auer’s rehabilitators, Auer today finds its future
uncertain. The Court has taken up the question of whether Auer and
Seminole Rock should be overruled,154 and it is not difficult to count to
five. Chief Justice Roberts 155 and Justices Alito, 156 Thomas, 157 and
Gorsuch158 have expressed strong reservations about Auer, and Justice
Kavanaugh’s previous statements as a circuit judge suggest some antipathy
in shaping their drafting decisions, id. at 1020, and it was even unclear what respondents
had in mind when they said they “use” the doctrine, id. at 1066. These findings are
consistent with the data analyzed in Part III: Not one of the preambles among rules in the
sample contained any reference to either Seminole Rock or Auer.
152. Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 309–10 (“We do
not believe that agencies often preserve ambiguity on purpose—in fact we think that that
is highly unusual—but when they do, Auer is hardly ever . . . part of the picture. The critics
speak abstractly of possible abuses, but present no empirical evidence to substantiate their
fears.”); see also Levin, supra note 148 (“[T]he factual basis of the critique of Auer isn’t
paltry. It’s one hundred percent guesswork.”).
153. See Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 309 (refusing
to press the cross-cutting incentives argument too far for fear that doing so would “commit
the sign fallacy (with a different sign)”).
154. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
155. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (“The bar is now aware that there is some interest in reconsidering [Auer and
Seminole Rock], and has available to it a concise statement of the arguments on one side of
the issue.”).
156. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210–11 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“The opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas offer substantial reasons
why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.”).
157. See Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052, 1052 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Seminole Rock is constitutionally suspect.”).
158. See id. Justice Gorsuch’s views about deference doctrines may well be the
strongest on the Court. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Schroeder & Jason B. Hutt, Gorsuch May
Further Tip Balance Against Deference to EPA, Law360 (Feb. 14, 2017), https://
www.law360.com/articles/890417/gorsuch-may-further-tip-balance-against-deference-to-epa
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing Justice Gorsuch’s expressed skepticism
of judicial deference to agency interpretation and discussing the possibility of Auer being
overturned following Justice Gorsuch joining the Court); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and
Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe the time has come
to face the behemoth.”).
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toward Auer as well.159 In the circuit courts, Auer continues to be followed
(at least for now), but it also finds itself subjected to stern criticism. For
example, Judge William Jordan of the Third Circuit recently indicated
that he believes Auer “deserves another look,” arguing that it is “contrary
to the roles assigned to the separate branches of government” and
“embed[s] perverse incentives in the operations of government.”160
Even when courts nominally accept the premises of Auer deference,
the tenor of some analysis has recently shifted in a less deferential direc-
tion due in part to courts’ recognition that the critique of Auer has pur-
chase with some members of the Supreme Court. For instance, in Perez v.
Loren Cook Co., a majority of the en banc Eighth Circuit held that a
Department of Labor (DOL) regulation requiring “machine guarding”
as a means of protection from “hazards such as those created by . . . rotat-
ing parts” did not require barrier guards to protect against ejection of
rapidly rotating pieces of metal, contrary to DOL’s interpretation.161 But
as the four dissenting judges noted, the majority’s “hypertechnical” pars-
ing of the regulation was contrary to the spirit of Auer and risked
undermining the Secretary of Labor’s ability to “adjust its interpreta-
tion . . . over time.”162 Even if Auer survives Kisor v. Wilkie in some form,
skepticism and avoidance like this will likely continue to pervade courts’
decisionmaking.
The reason for the persistence and influence of the critique of Auer
is that its account of strategic agencies’ self-delegating authority has a
certain theoretical appeal. If one assumes that agencies have preferences,
and that those preferences are chiefly to maximize power and discretion
in a self-interested manner,163 then there is little that stands in the way of
the seemingly elegant model offered by Auer’s critics. It may be that there
are cross-cutting incentives that make agencies consciously pass on the
opportunity for self-delegation,164 but this more complex story may not
seem as facially plausible or nearly as self-interested as the one offered by
Auer’s critics. This is presumably why Manning, fully aware of cross-cut-
ting incentives for agencies to craft clear rules, nevertheless argued that
Auer’s perverse incentives are stronger than the benign or laudable ones
159. See supra note 95.
160. Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
161. 803 F.3d 935, 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.212(a)(1) (2015)).
162. Id. at 944–50 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
163. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 Geo. L.J. 97, 99 (2000) (describing the early public-choice literature as “por-
traying agency bureaucrats as shirking, self-interested budget-maximizers who thwart the
will of the people and good government”).
164. See Levin, supra note 148 (noting that Auer’s incentive to write vague rules “does
not exist in a vacuum” and that many factors “militate toward specificity rather than
vagueness”).
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created by other doctrines or operational exigencies. 165 Although
Sunstein and Vermeule are right to point out that critics’ self-delegation
theory commits the “sign fallacy,”166 those critics can still appeal to an
intuition that suggests that Auer must matter in some way by creating
some kind of structural bias. The persuasiveness of the self-delegation
critique of Auer boils down to the fact that it paints an intuitively plausi-
ble picture of agency self-dealing that stands so long as no one puts for-
ward any evidence.
The main obstacle to advancing the debate is a lack of evidence. As
Professor Steve Johnson has written, we have two choices: “[A]ware of
the possibility of abuse described by Manning and Scalia, we could disre-
gard [Auer] deference entirely because of the possibility, or we could stay
our hand until a convincing record has been established that the possibil-
ity turns into actuality with sufficient frequency and consequence.”167 In
what follows, the Article turns to the project of filling out our
understanding of Auer’s effects on agency rule writing—particularly,
examining whether Auer encourages an increase in the vagueness of
agency rules.
III. TESTING THE SELF-DELEGATION THESIS
Auer’s future would seem to hinge in no small part on what the evi-
dence actually says about the potentially perverse incentives created by
the doctrine. This Part makes an in-depth and systematic effort to assess
whether Auer’s incentives do manifest in changed rule-writing behavior.
In examining whether Auer has changed the ways agencies write rules,
this Part draws on several different strands of textual-analysis methods
used in computational linguistics, psycholinguistics, political science, and
regulatory studies. Public law scholars are increasingly turning to corpus
linguistics methods to bring systemic empirical evidence to bear on large
bodies of legal text.168 In order to test the key predictions of the self-
delegation thesis, it is necessary to use these kinds of sophisticated
linguistic techniques to analyze over time the work product of agencies—
that is, the text of their regulations.
A. Data
This section reviews the original data I collected to test the self-
delegation thesis, including the sample of rules used for analysis and the
specific measures of textual vagueness employed.
165. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
167. Steve R. Johnson, Auer/Seminole Rock Deference in the Tax Court, 11 Pitt. Tax.
Rev. 1, 40 n.213 (2013).
168. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 Yale L.J. 788, 830–36 (2018) (detailing the range of corpus linguistic tools available to
study “ordinary meaning”).
2019] SELF-DELEGATION FALSE ALARM 119
1. Sample. — Seeking to capture as broad a sample of regulatory
texts as possible, I gathered every “economically significant”169 final rule
reviewed by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) and published in the Federal Register between 1982 and
2016.170 In all, there were 1,218 such rules published by twenty-eight
different departments, agencies, and boards during the observation
period. These entities ranged from the familiar—for example, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Transportation
(DOT), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the like—to the less familiar—
for example, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board and the Emergency Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Board.171 The
textual data assembled represent a broad swath of the administrative
169. Technically, economically significant rules are those identified by the agencies as
having “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect[ing]
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs,
the environment, public health or safety, or State, local or tribal governments or
communities.” Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., R43056, Counting Regulations: An
Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register
10–11 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY8P-96MM].
This definition originated in Executive Order 12,866 in 1993 and was the trigger for the
requirement of a full regulatory impact analysis. See Regulatory Planning and Review,
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993). Before Executive
Order 12,866, the trigger was a slightly broader category of “major” rules, of which one
subset was what would today be considered economically significant rules. See Steven
Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 821, 825 (2003) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 128 (1981)). The Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs has logged in historical reports the reviews of
economically significant rules back to 1981; these reports are what I used to identify a
sample of rules. See infra note 170.
170. These data were assembled in a two-step process, one involving rule identification
and one involving text collection and cleaning. First, rules were identified using XML
reports of data on rule reviews conducted by OIRA. These data are housed on OIRA’s
website Reginfo.gov and go back to 1981. See Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, XML Reports, Reginfo.gov, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/XMLReportList
[https://perma.cc/BH6K-7H8V] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018). A research assistant
extracted all rules that fit certain criteria: Principally, to be included, an entry had to be a
final rule, listed as economically significant, and listed as having been published. Almost
all of the rules listed in the reviews conducted in 1981 were not published, so I made the
decision to exclude 1981 from the analysis. For the rest of the years available, most reviews
resulted in publication, and they were therefore included. Second, using data culled from
the XML reports, I was able to manually identify the Federal Register notice publishing the
rule for all but a handful of the rules in the sample. Using Lexis Advance’s Federal
Register Library, I then bulk downloaded the entire text of the notice for each of the iden-
tified rules.
171. This sample excludes independent agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, SEC, and FCC, because they are not subject to OIRA review, and therefore,
their rules were not available in the dataset derived from Reginfo.gov.
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state and capture the bulk of the important rulemaking activity con-
ducted by it.172
2. Measures of Vagueness. — For each rule in the sample, I first parti-
tioned the document into the preamble and the rule text.173 I then sub-
jected each rule’s text to computer-assisted content analysis to generate a
number of measures of vagueness for each text.174 Relative to human
coding, computer-assisted content analysis is faster, cheaper, and orders
of magnitude more reliable.175 Human coders tire and make computa-
tional mistakes; computers do not. Thus, with over 1,200 rules and over
19 million words, computer-assisted content analysis is by far the best
approach to measuring the vagueness of texts, although substantial care
has to be taken to ensure that what the computer is measuring captures
what we mean when we say that a regulatory text is vague.176 This section
describes the steps I took—including the deployment of multiple
measures and validation with human readers—to provide that assurance.
The concern with Auer is a concern about an agency’s propensity to
promulgate what the D.C. Circuit has called “mush.”177 Specifically, the
concern is with language that is cast with such a degree of vagueness that
it fails to meaningfully constrain or guide subsequent interpretation,
172. One might object that economically significant rules are critically different from
other rules and that focusing only on these rules risks introducing sampling bias insofar as
the goal is to say something about rulemaking writ large. This concern is addressed in
section III.F.2.
173. The process in note 170 supra actually identified 1,318 rules, but some of the
Federal Register notices associated with these rules failed to provide regulatory text distinct
from the preamble. As such, they were excluded from the final analysis.
174. For three of the measures of vagueness (legal vagueness, laxity, and cognitive
complexity), I used the program Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), which allows
the user to apply both built-in and user-provided dictionaries to selected texts, counting
the instances of each dictionary term and generating statistics on the percentage of the
document composed of terms in the dictionary. See Yla R. Tausczik & James W.
Pennebaker, The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis
Methods, 29 J. Language & Soc. Psychol. 24, 25–28 (2010) (reviewing the history of LIWC
and describing the software’s processing and dictionary features); see also James W.
Pennebaker et al., Univ. of Tex. at Austin, The Development of Psychometric Properties of
LIWC2015 2–7 (2015), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/31333/
LIWC2015_LanguageManual.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining how
the latest version of the LIWC software analyzes words and phrases based on psychometric
categories assigned to words in built-in or user-generated dictionaries). For the final
measure (polysemy), I used Python to analyze the textual data. See generally Python
Frequently Asked Questions, Python Software Found., https://docs.python.org/3/faq/
[https://perma.cc/Y5MD-6HRU] (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
175. See Justin Grimmer & Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls
of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 21 Pol. Analysis 267, 267–69
(2013) (discussing the methodology of automated language analysis and its advantages in
validity); David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 192 (2016) (same).
176. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
177. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and then give it concrete form
only through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”).
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giving agencies more room within which to operate. As the concept of
“vagueness” might be conceived in different ways,178 to provide a robust
assessment of the self-delegation thesis, I selected several complementary
measures that serve as proxies for vagueness. My four measures—legal
vagueness, laxity, cognitive complexity, and polysemy—are described in
the following paragraphs. In the empirical analysis, each measure is
scaled so that greater values equate to greater vagueness, and lower
values equate to greater clarity. The discussion of each of these measures
of vagueness provides examples from a validation exercise using real
regulatory texts in Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations—governing
food labeling and packaging—and human coders’ evaluations of the
vagueness of those texts.179
a. Legal Vagueness. — The first measure is an index based on a list of
commonly used legal terms that fail to convey much practical guidance.
Phrases like “reasonable precautions” and “prudent investor” use terms
that do not by themselves convey criteria capable of deciding concrete
cases. When these kinds of expressions appear in regulations, they add
little precision and thus are prime candidates for identifying instances of
an agency “enacting placeholder regulations and doing the real
policymaking work in subsequent so-called interpretations.”180 In Shalala
178. Vagueness is generally defined as the “use [of] concepts that have indefinite
application to particular cases,” Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Vagueness &
Ambiguity, Legal Theory Blog (June 28, 2015), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/
2015/06/legal-theory-lexicon-vagueness-ambiguity.html [https://perma.cc/J3HX-TZMG],
and it usually is sharply distinguished from ambiguity by linguists, see, e.g., George Dunbar,
Towards a Cognitive Analysis of Polysemy, Ambiguity, and Vagueness, 12 Cognitive Linguistics
1, 2 (2001) (“A word is vague with respect to an interpretative element of meaning if it
does not supply it; it is ambiguous between two elements if it supplies one or the other.”).
Moreover, linguists often describe vagueness as having specialized classes, including soritical
vagueness, combinatorial vagueness, and pragmatic vagueness. See Geert Keil & Ralf
Poscher, Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, in Vagueness and
Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives 1, 1–2 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016)
[hereinafter Vagueness and Law] (discussing different categories of vagueness and the legal
implications of their distinctions).
179. I tested the validity of the measures by sampling sentences from Title 21, chapter
1, subchapter B, identifying the sentences that registered as extreme (both high and low)
on each of my four measures, and giving those sentences to twelve human coders to rate
on a seven-point Likert Scale for overall vagueness. A statistical analysis showed that raters
were able to systematically distinguish between high-scoring sentences and low-scoring
sentences, which in turn suggests that the measures are capturing much of what human
readers consider to be vagueness. In addition, the fact that preambles scored significantly
higher on average than the associated rule texts for three of the four measures (and
basically identically in the fourth) reinforces the validity findings. After all, in Justice
Thomas’s formulation of the self-delegation thesis, the problem is that rule texts affected
by the incentives read more like preambles than rules. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518–19 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining his concern about
affording deference to “precatory” language that “reads more like a preamble than a
law”).
180. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 7, at 1468–69. Indeed, Stephenson and
Pogoriler use the example of an agency “announcing that regulated entities must behave
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v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, for example, the Supreme Court dealt with
vague language of this kind.181 The question in that case hinged on the
Secretary of Health and Human Services’ interpretation of a regulation
outlining “principles of cost reimbursement”182 in the Medicare pro-
gram, and whether it permitted the Secretary to depart from generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in determining reimbursement
for “reasonable costs.”183 The Secretary maintained that the regulation
only described the recordkeeping steps providers needed to take and
remained silent on whether the Secretary could depart from GAAP.184
The Supreme Court seized on language from the relevant regulation
providing that “the methods of determining costs payable under
Medicare involve making use of data available from the institution’s basis
accounts, as usually maintained, to arrive at equitable and proper payment
for services to beneficiaries” 185 to conclude that the Secretary’s
interpretation was correct, and that “a provider’s basic financial infor-
mation is organized according to GAAP as a beginning point” from
which the Secretary can make an equitable and proper reimbursement
decision on grounds other than GAAP.186 Manning’s influential article in
fact highlighted the vagueness in this regulation as a prime example of
Auer’s alleged perverse incentives for rule writing.187
While it would probably be difficult to capture all of the words and
phrases in the law that might fit the billing of legal vagueness, I con-
structed a core dictionary of paradigmatically vague terms, such as
reasonable, prudent, appropriate, and feasible.188 Using the program Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), I then calculated the total percentage
of the words in each document falling in the dictionary. The resulting
percentage is the measure referred to as legal vagueness in my analysis.
‘appropriately’” to show how agencies might use inherently vague terms to increase their
discretion. Id. “Appropriate” is one of the terms included in the “vagueness” dictionary in
this Article. See infra note 188.
181. See 514 U.S. 87, 92 (1995) (noting that the case turned, in part, on the meaning
of the vague phrase “[s]tandardized definitions, accounting, statistics, and reporting
practices” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.20(a) (1994))).
182. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(a)).
183. Id. at 91 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)
(1994)).
184. Id. at 92–93.
185. Id. at 92 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.20(a)).
186. Id. at 92–93.
187. Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 113, at 657–60.
188. I constructed this list by reading a number of statutes and noting words that
seemed inherently vague, given some level of legal sophistication. The complete list of
words used in the legal vagueness measure is as follows: reason*, prudent, best, available,
possible *, optimal *, appropriate *, feasible *, acceptable, unreason*, careful *, proper *, undue *,
unavailable, impossible *, infeasible *, unacceptable *, caution. Asterisks indicate that I included
all derivatives from suffixation (for example, appropriate *ly).
2019] SELF-DELEGATION FALSE ALARM 123
The measure is quite effective at distinguishing high-vagueness text
from low-vagueness text. An example of a regulatory sentence that scored
extremely high on this measure reads as follows: “Reasonable deficien-
cies of calories, total sugars, added sugars, total fat, saturated fat, trans fat,
cholesterol, or sodium under labeled amounts are acceptable within cur-
rent good manufacturing practice.”189 In contrast, the following sentence
scored extremely low on the measure: “The calorie declaration for a
packaged food must include the total calories present in the packaged
food, regardless of whether the packaged food contains a single serving
or multiple servings.”190
b. Laxity. — The second measure relies on the distinction between
legal terms that are inherently binding and those that are inherently
lax.191 For instance, words like shall and must indicate a clear command;
regulated parties ignore these kinds of commands at their peril. But at
the same time, words like may and should leave regulated parties with
greater uncertainty and leave law enforcers with a greater degree of
discretion. Capturing the balance of these two categories of terms in a
given legal text could reveal just how clear a regulator has been about the
legal duty the text imposes. Lest a regulator do serious damage to its pro-
grams, it will most likely not issue a stern command unless it has itself
confirmed that the accompanying requirements are spelled out to cap-
ture precisely the conduct that the regulator means to capture.
To construct the laxity measure, I started by developing a simple list
of common permissive legal terms and a list of common compulsory
legal terms and ran the dictionary on the rule texts as with the measure
above.192 I then subtracted the percentage of compulsory terms in a text
from the percentage of permissive terms in a text to generate an aggre-
gate index for laxity that measures the degree to which a given text fails
to give relatively binding instructions. Again, the measure of laxity seems
to capture intuitive distinctions between sentences. An example of a
high-laxity sentence reads: “Such representations may be made either by
statements, photographs, or vignettes.”193 By contrast, an example of a
low-laxity sentence is the following: “A common fraction shall be reduced
189. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(g)(6) (2018).
190. Id. § 101.8(c)(2)(C).
191. To some extent, the resulting measure is related to the Mercatus Center’s
RegData measures of regulatory constraint, see Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin,
RegData: A Numerical Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All United States
Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997–2012, 11 Reg. & Gov. 109, 112 (2017), but it was
necessary to construct my own measure because the RegData are only available for all
regulations that have already been promulgated and incorporated into the Code of
Federal Regulations. My sample identification process thus precluded use of RegData.
192. The complete list of words in the “compulsory” dictionary is as follows: must,
shall, will, cannot, never. The complete list of words in the “permissive” dictionary is as
follows: could, might, can, probably, may, should.
193. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(l)(2).
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to its lowest terms; a decimal fraction shall not be carried out to more
than two places.”194
c. Cognitive Complexity. — Psychologists have argued that writing can
be scaled in terms of its degree of “cognitive complexity.”195 For the third
measure, I employed a widely used measure of cognitive complexity196 on
the assumption that regulations may be more malleable when they
194. Id. § 101.7(d).
195. See Tausczik & Pennebaker, supra note 174, at 35 (“Cognitive complexity can be
thought of as a richness of two components of reasoning: the extent to which someone
differentiates between multiple competing solutions and the extent to which someone
integrates among solutions.”).
196. I followed the lead of a number of recent studies of Supreme Court opinion
writing in employing the measure of cognitive complexity. See, e.g., Pamela Corley &
Justin Wedeking, The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in
Language, 48 Law & Soc’y Rev. 35, 43 (2014) (using the LIWC program to measure the
degree of certainty in Supreme Court majority opinions); Frank B. Cross & James W.
Pennebaker, The Language of the Roberts Court, 2014 Mich. St. L. Rev. 853, 866 (using
the LIWC program to analyze cognitive processes in opinions from the first five years of
the Roberts Court); Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity
on the U.S. Supreme Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 9–10 (1995) (comparing cognitive complexity in majority
and dissenting Supreme Court decisions and in decisions written by liberal and conser-
vative Justices); Ryan J. Owens & Justin P. Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing
the Complexity of Supreme Court Opinions, 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1027, 1039–40 (2011)
[hereinafter Owens & Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity] (describing a method for
measuring cognitive complexity in Supreme Court opinions using the LIWC program); Ryan
J. Owens & Justin Wedeking, Predicting Drift on Politically Insulated Institutions: A Study
of Ideological Drift on the United States Supreme Court, 74 J. Pol. 487, 491–93 (2012)
[hereinafter Owens & Wedeking, Predicting Drift] (measuring the cognitive complexity of
Supreme Court Justices over their lifetime, both before and after being nominated to the
Court, using a LIWC program); Philip E. Tetlock, Jane Bernzweig & Jack L. Gallant,
Supreme Court Decision Making: Cognitive Style as a Predictor of Ideological Consistency
of Voting, 48 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1227, 1229–31 (1985) (describing the linguistic
analysis required to measure integrative complexity in Supreme Court opinions). For a
useful summary of this literature, see Ryan C. Black et al., U.S. Supreme Court Opinions
and Their Audiences 40–46 (2016).
The built-in dictionaries I used, following the literature above, contained categories
of words that are theorized to be proxies for cognitive complexity. These dictionaries
include: causation words (for example, because, effect, hence, and depend), insight words (for
example, think, know, and consider), discrepancy words (for example, should, would, and
could), tentativeness words (for example, maybe, perhaps, and fairly), certainty words (for
example, always, never, and absolutely), difference words (for example, hasn’t, but, and else),
negation words (for example, no, not, and never), and six-letter words (that is, words with
more than six letters, which are thought to be correlated with sophistication and complex-
ity). After obtaining raw percentage scores for each of these categories in each text, I
standardized the scores by obtaining z-scores for each category in each text. The z-score is
simply z = " # !$ , where x is the observed raw score, µ is the mean score for all texts, and σ is
the standard deviation. Finally, again following the method outlined in prior studies, see
Owens & Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity, supra, at 1039–40, I summed the
standardized scores that indicated greater cognitive complexity and subtracted the stan-
dardized scores associated with simplicity (that is, certainty and negation words) to create
an aggregate measure of cognitive complexity for each text in the dataset.
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implicitly (or explicitly) acknowledge different layers of a policy prob-
lem. These layers might provide the policy justification for an interpre-
tive change at a later time. Indeed, cognitive complexity seems to have
been the focus of Justice Thomas’s concerns in Thomas Jefferson University
v. Shalala, in which he lamented that a rule that he asserted had
succumbed to the perverse incentive thesis looked more like preamble
text than law proper.197 Preambles contain more of the justification for,
and purposes behind, a rule, often highlighting competing consider-
ations at play in the agency’s thinking, responding to various critiques of
a proposed action, and seeking to build a complete record for judicial
review. They are inherently cognitively complex.
Cognitive complexity, therefore, is well suited to capture at least this
dimension of vagueness in rule texts. Rule texts that score high on cogni-
tive complexity tend to use “multidimensional terms and to integrate a
variety of evidence,”198 while low cognitive complexity denotes the kind
of “conceptual organization of decision-relevant information” charac-
teristic of codified legal text.199 When an agency writes in a cognitively
complex style, it is in effect leaving itself room to emphasize different
facts or different considerations in the next round of decisionmaking.
For instance, Professors Ryan Owens and Justin Wedeking find that mea-
sures of cognitive complexity in the opinions authored by Supreme
Court Justices predict ideological drift over the course of their careers.200
This is precisely what critics of Auer see agencies doing—using under-
specification in the first round of play to sandbag for greater authority or
discretion in future situations. In other words, cognitive complexity
proxies for the capacity for plausible drift.
The expectation is that prose low in cognitive complexity will appear
crisp and simple, whereas prose high in cognitive complexity will read as
muddled and complicated. Indeed, an example of a high-scoring sentence
on the measure reads: “Fat and/or oil ingredients not present in the
197. 512 U.S. 504, 519 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. Tetlock, Bernzweig & Gallant, supra note 196, at 1228. More specifically, cognitive
complexity consists of two related concepts called “differentiation” and “integration.” The
former “represents the degree to which an individual can see multiple perspectives or
dimensions in an issue,” and the latter indicates “the degree to which a person recognizes
relationships and connections among these perspectives or dimensions and integrates
them into their decision or judgment.” Black et al., supra note 196, at 44.
199. Gruenfeld, supra note 196, at 5. There are obviously important parallels with the
literature on rules versus standards. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 586–90 (1992) (discussing the varying degrees of
complexity that can be written into rules and standards); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral
Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 32 (2000)
(noting that dispute resolution through standards is usually, but not always, more complex
than dispute resolution through rules). Indeed, Owens and Wedeking find that Justice
Scalia, a well-known enthusiast of rules, wrote opinions that displayed comparatively low
scores on measures of cognitive complexity. Owens & Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity,
supra note 196, at 1044.
200. See Owens & Wedeking, Predicting Drift, supra note 196, at 498–99.
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product may be listed if they may sometimes be used in the product.”201
In contrast, a low-scoring example is: “Label serving size for ice cream
cones, eggs, and breath mints of all sizes will be 1 unit.”202 The first
sentence takes time to process because it involves contingencies, whereas
the second sentence is a straightforward command.
d. Polysemy. — A final measure relates to what philosophers of lan-
guage call “combinatorial vagueness,” which arises when a speaker or
writer “ha[s] not formed an intention with regard to the inclusion or
exclusion of certain objects.”203 This kind of categorization problem is
likely the source of the lion’s share of disputes about federal statutes, and
it extends well beyond the kind of paradigmatic legal vagueness discussed
above.204 For instance, courts have had to grapple with such questions as
whether a statute defining “motor vehicle” to include “an automobile,
automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-pro-
pelled vehicle not designed for running on rails” includes airplanes.205
They have also had to grapple with whether the Voting Rights Act’s use of
the term “elect[ed] representatives” includes judges who are elected.206
In essence, vagueness arises when a legal text chooses a word that is gen-
eral enough to elide costly determinations about what is and what is not
included.
In an effort to account for this kind of vagueness in the rules in the
sample, I employed the concepts of hyponymy and hypernymy, which
provide a way of hierarchically mapping the relationships between words
on the dimension of specificity.207 A hyponym is a subordinate of a hyper-
nym: For instance, the word orange is a hyponym of fruit, and fruit is a
hyponym of food. Conversely, a hypernym is a superordinate of another
word.208 Thus, the word fruit is a hypernym of orange, but so is color. These
concepts, when applied to the words that are actually used in a text,
capture quite cleanly at least one key dimension of what concerns Auer’s
201. 21 C.F.R. § 101.4(b)(14) (2018).
202. Id. § 101.12 tbl.2 & n.8.
203. See Ralf Poscher, An Intentionalist Account of Vagueness: A Legal Perpsective, in
Vagueness and Law, supra note 178, at 65, 85.
204. See Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation
35 (2010) (“Cases involving linguistic ambiguity are far less common than those involving
conceptual vagueness . . . .”).
205. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25–26 (1931) (quoting National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act, ch. 89, § 2(a), 41 Stat. 324, 324 (1919) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2311
(2012))).
206. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 385 (1991) (quoting Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 131, 134 (current version
at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012))).
207. See George A. Miller, WordNet: A Lexical Database for English, Comm. of the
ACM, Nov. 1995, at 39, 40, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ec6e/56339e0b2f5c2f464a7a
48b536b78bfeafba.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (defining and explaining
“hyponymy” and “hypernymy”).
208. Id.
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critics, which is systematic evasiveness in providing the details of what
triggers a legal obligation. If the count of hyponyms associated with the
words in a text is relatively large (that is, the words actually used are
hypernyms of a relatively high number of hyponyms), this suggests for-
gone specificity, because a “hyponym inherits all the features of the more
generic concept and adds at least one feature that distinguishes it from
its superordinate and from any other hyponyms of that superordinate.”209
If an agency is withholding clarity strategically, we would expect that
agencies would choose more words that decline to specify that addi-
tional, clarifying feature. Likewise, a high count of hypernyms could cre-
ate vagueness because a large number of superordinate concepts associ-
ated with a given word would require the reader to differentiate that
word’s true subordinate relationship from those distinct concepts. Of
course, hypernymy is also associated with specificity, as the agency could
have used a more overarching term. The end goal is to use the concepts
of hypernymy and hyponymy to place each word in a hierarchy of more
general terms to more specific terms. In essence, the higher a word is in
the hierarchy—and the greater the number of distinct words below it—
the more potentially vague the word is.
Using a lexical database called WordNet,210 which is widely used in
natural language processing and artificial intelligence, I was able to
count the number of hyponyms and hypernyms linked to each word in
the sample rules and generate document-level averages of these
counts.211 The result generated two measures of possible vagueness—
nondistinction of subordinate concepts (that is, average rate of hyponyms
for the words in a given text) and nondistinction of entirely different word
senses, or lexical ambiguity (that is, average rate of hypernyms for a given
text)—which I then added together to form an index labeled “polysemy.”
Again, examples from the FDA’s food-labeling regulations help demon-
strate what distinguishes text under this measure. A low-scoring sentence
reads: “The gram (mL) quantity between 2 and 5 g (mL) should be
rounded to the nearest .05 g (mL) and the g (mL) quantity less than 2 g
(mL) should be expressed in .01-g (mL) increments.”212 A high-scoring
example stands in sharp contrast for its verbosity: “Substance means a
specific food or component of food, regardless of whether the food is in
conventional food form or a dietary supplement that includes vitamins,
209. George A. Miller et al., Introduction to WordNet: An On-line Lexical Database 8
(1993), http://wordnetcode.princeton.edu/5papers.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSV6-LPM6].
210. WordNet, https://wordnet.princeton.edu/ [https://perma.cc/SQP3-ZX2D] (last
visited Sept. 14, 2018). For background on WordNet and its potential applications, see gen-
erally Richard Beckwith et al., WordNet: A Lexical Database Organized on Psycholinguistic
Principles, in Lexical Acquisition: Exploiting On-Line Resources to Build a Lexicon 211
(Uri Zernik ed., 1991).
211. WordNet uses a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to hierarchically graph the links
between words in terms of hypernymy and hyponymy. For a visual example of a WordNet
DAG, see Beckwith et al., supra note 210, at 216 fig.9.1.
212. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(b)(7)(ii) (2018).
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minerals, herbs, or other similar nutritional substances.”213 This latter
sentence employs general categories, such as food, minerals, and herbs,
that leave the agency with ample room to make arguments that a
particular item is really outside the ambit of the overarching category.
The polysemy measure aims to pick up differences between regulatory
texts on just this tendency to employ broad categories instead of specific
terms.
B. Aggregate Trends
My starting point for testing whether Auer’s incentives translate into
effects on agency behavior was to look at aggregate trends on the core
measures of linguistic “mush” described in section III.A.2. Figure 3 pre-
sents the time series trends of the median values of each of the four
vagueness measures for rules from 1982 through 2016. If there is a sys-
temic perverse effect of the doctrine on rule writing, there should be a
generally positive trend on the measures of vagueness following Auer,
given that positive citations to Auer have continued to grow over time. At
the very least, if Auer created strong perverse incentives, there should be
some indication that the post-Auer period has seen higher levels of vague-
ness than the pre-Auer period.
Even at this general level, it is clear that there are some difficulties
for the self-delegation thesis. First, for the entire sample, only two of the
measures show statistically significant trends over time. Legal vagueness
decreased by an average of .004 per year from 1982 through 2016 (p>|t| =
.000), while laxity increased by an average of .005 per year over the same
time period (p>|t| = .048). For the other two measures, agencies have
been static in terms of the specificity of their writing over a nearly forty-
year period that saw the rise of Auer deference.214
213. Id. § 101.14(a)(2).
214. See supra section I.A & Figure 1 (describing and showing the increasing promi-
nence of Auer and Seminole Rock).
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FIGURE 3: STANDARDIZED INDICES OF RULE-TEXT VAGUENESS, 1982–2016215
Second, none of the four measures of vagueness show any statisti-
cally significant trend when looking only at rules published in 1997 or
later. Two measures—cognitive complexity and polysemy—show increases
in the propensity for vagueness but fall far short of statistical significance
(p>|t| = .587 and .926, respectively) during this period. The other two
measures—legal vagueness and laxity—indicate decreases in vagueness
since 1997, even though those changes also fall short of statistical
significance (p>|t| = .184 and .115, respectively). In contrast, the period
before Auer did see statistically significant movement on at least one of
these variables. From 1982 through 1996, agencies’ rules trended
downward (statistically significantly so, at the .01 level) on the measure of
legal vagueness. Two of the other variables—laxity and cognitive
complexity—showed a negative trend, but not statistically distinguishable
from zero. Polysemy trended upward but, again, not at a statistically
significant rate.
215. The solid lines represent median values, shown as z-scores, for each year on the
selected index across all agencies. The vertical dashed lines show the year 1997, when Auer
was decided.
-4
-2
0
2
4
1980 1990 2000 2010
L
eg
al
V
ag
ue
ne
ss
-4
-2
0
2
4
1980 1990 2000 2010
L
ax
it
y
-4
-2
0
2
4
1980 1990 2000 2010
C
og
ni
ti
ve
C
om
pl
ex
it
y
-4
-2
0
2
4
1980 1990 2000 2010
Po
ly
se
m
y
130 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:85
TABLE 1: DIFFERENCE OF MEANS, PRE- AND POST-AUER216
Legal
Vagueness Laxity
Cognitive
Complexity Polysemy
Mean Pre-Auer .277 -.603 -.208 4.63
Mean Post-Auer .241 -.462 .105 4.40
Difference in
Means -.036 .141 .313 -0.23
P-Value .014* .000*** .158 .000***
N 1218 1218 1218 1218
In terms of simple differences in means between the two periods,
most of the data are, again, inconsistent with the self-delegation thesis. As
Table 1 shows, the post-Auer mean for two of the measures—legal vague-
ness and polysemy—was significantly lower than the pre-Auer mean. The
difference with cognitive complexity is not statistically distinguishable
from zero. Only one piece of evidence possibly squares with the self-
delegation thesis’s basic predictions: Laxity does show a statistically signi-
ficant increase post-Auer.
While this comparison of means offers just an initial overview of the
data, it is a highly suggestive one. Most of the evidence suggests that the
post-Auer period has been marked by abnormally precise regulatory lan-
guage or that it has not been substantially different than it was before
Auer.217
C. Agency-Specific Trends
As informative as aggregate trends can be, collapsing the data into
one time series for all agencies sacrifices much of the interesting varia-
tion. Although there is significant coordination between agencies in
rulemaking,218 agencies are largely independent of one another and
come to the rule-writing task with drastically different baselines.219
216. P-values are from a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the difference of
means is zero. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: p<.1 = ^, p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **,
p<.001 = ***. Statistically significant p-values indicate that the null hypothesis of zero
difference can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that there was a significant
change not attributable to natural variation.
217. The analysis to this point does not allow one to say whether the post-Auer rules
changed the trend, or slope, relative to the pre-Auer trend. This possibility is explored in
greater detail in sections III.D and III.E using interrupted time series methods.
218. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1136–37 (2012) (discussing efforts to promote coordination across
government agencies).
219. Some agencies may deal with subject matter that is inherently more vague
compared to the matters others deal with (imagine, for instance, the difference between
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Consequently there are significant differences in patterns in the data
across agencies. For instance, there is great variation in the frequency
with which each of the agencies produced rules. Only DOL, DOT, EPA,
HHS, and USDA published more than twenty economically significant
final rules during the period of observation. That means the rest of the
twenty-three agencies that published at least one rule during this entire
period averaged less than one final rule per year—and often much less
than that.
If agencies produce rules at starkly different rates, it might also stand
to reason that agencies would produce rules in very different ways. That
intuition is supported even when focusing just on agencies that produce
larger numbers of rules annually. Figure 4 plots the measures of vague-
ness used for this study for the six agencies—the Department of the
Interior (DOI), DOL, DOT, EPA, HHS, and USDA—that produced the
greatest number of economically significant final rules. The measures are
standardized (adjusted so that they all have means of zero and standard
deviations of one) for ease of presentation. As Figure 4 makes clear, the
agencies vary significantly in terms of the vagueness of their rules, and
the patterns do not necessarily correspond to the aggregate trends dis-
cussed in section III.B.
This heterogeneity is both a feature and a problem from the stand-
point of studying Auer’s incentives and effects. On the positive side, it is
possible to see a more nuanced picture of how individual agencies might
have responded to Auer. For instance, Figure 4 shows that, on the whole,
EPA and HHS have more or less steadily increased the clarity of their
rule texts over time. In contrast, DOL, DOT, and USDA show more vola-
tile patterns, with major upticks and downticks in vagueness both before
and after Auer. Statistically speaking, the data suggest that there may not
be a one-size-fits-all determinant of rule vagueness across agencies, and
any statistical analysis should control for agency differences.
technical air pollution regulations and antidiscrimination regulations), and some variation
might also exist because of the level of vagueness in the governing statutes that the
regulations seek to implement.
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FIGURE 4: STANDARDIZED INDICES OF VAGUENESS BY MAJOR RULEMAKING
AGENCY, 1982–2016220
220. Each panel displays agency-specific median values, shown as z-scores, for all four
measures of vagueness. The vertical dashed lines show the year 1997, when Auer was decided.
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That said, the variation in these data suggests a problem because the
self-delegation thesis posits a systematic effect that, in theory, should
apply across the board to all agencies. If certain agencies have highly
unique trends, outlier values, or just more rules than other agencies,
statistical methods that do not take account of agency-level effects will be
biased. Fortunately, it is possible to take account of this variation by
exploiting the panel structure of the data.221 The next two sections turn
to statistical tests to determine whether, accounting for this agency-level
heterogeneity, there is any effect from Auer.
D. Searching for a Link Between Incentives and Effect in Auer
In order to test more fully whether Auer might have had the effect of
encouraging agencies to write rules more vaguely, I used a quasi-experi-
mental method called an interrupted time series (ITS) design.222 An ITS
design allows me to measure the pre-Auer trend, or slope, using ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression, and then to estimate the post-Auer trend
on the same variable. The measure of interest is the difference between
the pre-Auer trend—which serves as a counterfactual prediction of what
would have occurred without any change in agency behavior—and the
observed post-Auer trend.223 This approach has been used to address
treatment effects in a wide range of legal and policy fields, from criminal
justice to education.224
221. Most empirical research on administrative behavior thus includes fixed effects at
the agency level. See O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking, supra note 131, at 932,
940. Fixed effects allow one to “control for all stable characteristics of the [entities] in the
study,” even without measuring these characteristics, by “completely ignor[ing] the
between-[entity] variation and focus[ing] only on the within-[entity] variation.” Paul D.
Allison, Fixed Effects Regression Methods for Longitudinal Data Using SAS 3–4 (2005).
Thus, each agency serves as its own control.
222. See generally Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Empirically Validating the Police
Liability Insurance Claim, 130 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 233, 239–40 (2017), http://
harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/vol130_Chandrasekher.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WV3G-F5G5] (“With interrupted time series, the researcher compares the level
of some outcome variable . . . right before and right after the imposition of some policy
that affects the availability (or level) of the treatment . . . .”).
223. See generally Ariel Linden, Conducting Interrupted Time-Series Analysis for
Single- and Multiple-Group Comparisons, 15 Stata J. 480, 481–82 (2015) (providing back-
ground on the methodology and usefulness on ITS analysis); A.K. Wagner et al., Segmented
Regression Analysis of Interrupted Time Series Studies in Medication Use Research, 27 J.
Clinical Pharmacy & Therapeutics 299, 301 (2002) (same).
224. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055,
1071–74 (1998) (using interrupted time series analysis to determine if crime clearance
rates declined after Miranda v. Arizona); Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity,
Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical
Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 543, 602–04 (1998) (measuring
change in education spending and centralization in school districts following school-finance
litigation); Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Plea Bargaining Policy and State District Court
Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 26 Law & Soc’y Rev. 139, 143–45 (1992)
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Table 2 presents the results of an ITS model using the entire time
series and a single treatment period starting in 1997. For each core meas-
ure of vagueness, Table 2 presents first the pre-Auer trend and then the
change to that trend. Three separate specifications are reported. All
three models include a fixed effect for the issuing department. Model 2
controls for the differences in baseline vagueness that might exist
between different rulemakings with very different subject matter. For
this, I used the preamble score for the corresponding measure of vague-
ness. If, for example, a rule on the meaning of “waters of the United
States” in the Clean Water Act deals with an inherently vague subject
matter, both the rule text and the preamble likely reflect that baseline
subject-matter vagueness. By including the control for preambles, there is
less risk that differences are driven by chance variation in the subject
matter that agencies choose (or are forced) to tackle. Finally, I included
standard measures about the political environment in Model 3. Agencies
might adjust their rule-writing strategy in response to their perceptions
about the likelihood of political oversight or the preferences of their
political principals. Thus, I included measures of whether the rule was
promulgated during (a) divided or unified government and (b) a
Republican or Democratic presidency.
The results in Table 2 provide no support for the hypothesis that
Auer caused agencies to write rules that are more “mushy” than the
norm. In fact, the strongest finding, from a statistical perspective, is that
Auer seems to have encouraged agencies to write less vaguely than before,
by one measure at least. During the post-Auer period, the average meas-
ure of rule laxity decreased by between .31 and .40 per year relative to
the pre-Auer trend—a total reversal for the agencies from their pre-Auer
trend toward more vagueness, and one that is statistically significant. For
the rest of the variables, the findings are not statistically significant. That
is, while there are directional changes indicated—negative for polysemy
and positive for legal vagueness and cognitive complexity—these findings
are not statistically distinguishable from the null hypothesis of no change
in trend.
(examining the relationship between plea bargaining policies and state court caseloads);
Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1525, 1546 & n.71 (2003)
(determining whether 28 U.S.C. § 1983 cases were filed less often in each circuit court as a
result of passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act); Jonathan W. Penney, Chilling
Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 117, 143–45 (2016)
(exploring whether internet traffic to “privacy-sensitive” Wikipedia articles decreased
following the June 2013 revelation of the NSA/PRISM surveillance program).
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TABLE 2: INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES MODELS OF THE EFFECT
OF AUER ON RULE VAGUENESS225
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Vagueness
Pre-Auer Trend -.006 -.001 -.000
Post-Auer Change .006 .001 .000
Laxity
Pre-Auer Trend .026** .018^ .014
Post-Auer Change -.040*** -.034** -.031**
Cognitive Complexity
Pre-Auer Trend -.110^ -.095^ -.078
Post-Auer Change .109 .086 .074
Polysemy
Pre-Auer Trend .020^ .021* .016
Post-Auer Change -.015 -.015 -.011
Controls
Department √ √ √
Preamble √ √
Political Environment √
These findings are also robust to adding a one-year lag to the treat-
ment.226 Even after accounting for a possible delayed onset by adding a
one-year lag, there are no statistically significant results. As an additional
robustness check, I also tested for short-term effects on agencies that
were only observable in the first few years immediately following the
decision. I used two windows of time: one with an observation period of
two years before and after Auer and a second with an observation period
of three years before and after Auer. For these two observation windows, I
estimated the same regressions as in Table 2. Limiting the analysis to
these windows, I found that none of the ITS estimates of post-Auer
225. Estimates are OLS with Newey-West Standard Errors. Observations are at the
department-year level (N=362). Statistical significance is denoted as follows: p<.1 = ^,
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***.
226. Using a lag accounts for a possible delayed effect. I do not report the results
because they are substantially similar to the results reported in Table 2.
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change were statistically significant. Thus, even if the hypothesized effect
of Auer is merely a short-term effect, there is no evidence to support it.
E. Testing the Effect of the Second Revolution
As a further effort to evaluate the self-delegation thesis, I tested
whether developments since 2005—namely, the Supreme Court’s signifi-
cant Auer-related decisions in Perez, Decker, Christopher, Talk America, and
Gonzales 227—have had any effect on agency rule writing. It is not exactly
clear as a matter of theory what kind of effect these developments might
have had on agency rule writing. On one level, the growing apprehen-
sion about Auer—as signaled by statements of disapproval from Chief
Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas and Alito, and the late Justice Scalia228—
suggests that the perverse incentive might have lost some of its luster for
agencies. If the Supreme Court is on the precipice of overturning Auer,
any rule intentionally obscured now would have an uncertain payoff were
there a change to the doctrine. At the same time, Auer is still good law.
Moreover, as Figures 1 and 2 suggest, Auer has never been more popular
in the circuit courts, as measured both by explicitly positive citations and
by total citations. Additionally, given that some scholars have viewed
recent decisions such as Perez 229 and the certiorari decisions in United
Student Aid Funds and Gloucester County230 as a signal that Auer was safe, at
least temporarily,231 there might be reason to suspect that Auer’s “second
revolution” had positively reinforced its perverse incentives.
Teasing out which, if any, of these hypotheses is correct involved
applying the same methodology from section III.D to these later treat-
ment dates. As a first cut, and taking my cue from Figures 1 and 2, which
show spikes in total citations, positive citations, and negative citations in
2005, I analyzed whether trends in agencies’ rule clarity changed appre-
ciably relative to the pre-2005 trend. I also tested whether there was any
change to the pre-2011 trend after the citations to Auer rose sharply in
2011. These dates roughly correspond to the litigation in Gonzales and
Talk America, two significant cases in which several Justices expressed
reservations about Auer.232 Table 3 presents the results of this ITS analysis.
227. See supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 96, 98 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. The Court’s decision to revisit Auer
deference this term in Kisor v. Wilkie suggests that the doctrine might no longer be safe.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 3: INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES MODELS OF RECENT AUER-RELATED
SUPREME COURT CASES233
Post-2005 (Gonzales) Post-2011 (Talk America)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Vagueness
Pre-Trend -.005* -.002 -.002 -.004* -.002 -.003
Trend Change .008 .004 .007 .014 .012 .012
Laxity
Pre-Trend .020*** .017*** .016*** .009* .007* .008*
Trend Change -.022^ -.023^ -.037* .002 -.010 -.011
Cognitive Complexity
Pre-Trend -.024 .003 .014 -.016 .002 .011
Trend Change .049 .007 .050 .179 .152 .144
Polysemy
Pre-Trend -.008 -.008 -.012* -.003 -.003 -.005
Trend Change .000 .002 .000 .017 .015 .018
Controls
Department √ √ √ √ √ √
Preamble √ √ √ √
Political Environment √ √
The results in Table 3, again, provide no support for the self-delega-
tion hypothesis. As with the analysis of Auer’s effect, both the post-2005
and the post-2011 periods show virtually no statistically significant changes
in agency rule writing, despite the fact that these years marked the
beginning of major upticks in citations to the doctrine. And, again, the
one statistically significant finding that does stand out is the statistically
significant negative change in the trend for laxity post-2005.
The results in Table 3 show changes in trends relative to the entire
pre-2005 and pre-2011 periods (that is, 1982 onward), and that is proba-
bly the appropriate baseline, given that section III.D found that Auer had
no effect. Nevertheless, as an additional robustness check, Table 4 pre-
sents the results of models looking at just the segment of time between
each of these salient treatment periods. That is, the models look at the
effect on the preexisting trend from 1997 up to 2005, and then at the
233. Estimates are OLS with Newey-West Standard Errors. Observations are at the
department-year level (N=362). Statistical significance is denoted as follows: p<.1 = ^,
p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***.
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effect on the preexisting trend from 2005 up to 2011. The results in
Table 4 provide no evidence in favor of either possible effect. On the
whole, these data show that the recent flurry of cases has had no effect
on agency rule writing one way or the other.
TABLE 4: SEGMENTED INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES RESULTS234
Post-2005 (Gonzales) Post-2011 (Talk America)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Legal Vagueness
Trend Change -.004 -.009 .016 .017 .017 .006
Laxity
Trend Change -.004 .052 -.016 -.029 -.042 -.013
Cognitive Complexity
Trend Change .057 -.045 -.256 -.023 .084 .156
Polysemy
Trend Change .027 .029 -.020 -.015 -.015 .011
Controls
Department √ √ √ √ √ √
Preamble √ √ √ √
Political Environment √ √
Arguably, agencies may still be waiting for the Court to make a move
before committing to any particular strategy. But this seems unlikely
given that the lack of any change in Table 4 simply fits the pattern of all
the other analyses. Agencies’ rule clarity appears quite strikingly to
remain unaffected by Auer, falling short of the expectations of the self-
delegation thesis.
F. Other Robustness Checks
The most notable statistically significant finding from all of the anal-
yses is the complete opposite of what the self-delegation thesis would
have predicted—clarity over legal duty actually increased following Auer,
234. Estimates are OLS with Newey-West Standard Errors. Observations are at the
department-year level (N=362). Models 1 through 3 show change in trends from 2005
onward relative to the approximate period of time between Auer and Gonzales (1997–
2005). Models 4 through 6 show change in trends from 2011 onward relative to the
approximate period of time between Gonzales and Talk America (2005–2011). Statistical
significance is denoted as follows: p<.1 = ^, p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***.
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as shown in Table 2.235 Otherwise, the findings from the ITS analysis are
null. Although null results mean that the analysis has yielded evidence
that the Auer effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero, they are
not, by themselves, sufficient to infer that the effect of Auer is truly zero.
There are thus limits to what can be inferred from this kind of evidence,
but null results are not meaningless and ignoring them can be problem-
atic.236 This is particularly the case when other attempts to analyze the
problem also fail to find any effect.
To that end, I supplemented the main analysis with a number of
robustness checks, and across the board the results are similar: Auer
appears to be unassociated with any systematic trends in agency rule writ-
ing. If numerous efforts to identify an effect fail to yield results, we can
be more confident that the null results are meaningful in their own right.
If nothing else, the burden of proof surely should shift decisively to
adherents of the self-delegation thesis to put forward evidence in support
of their assertions.
1. Alternate Treatment. — One potential concern might be that the
ITS methodology employed above fails to capture a true treatment
effect—that is, it might fail to capture the extent to which agencies were
aware of and likely to act on Auer’s incentives. That seems unlikely, as the
data in Part I indicated that Auer became widely cited and widely per-
ceived only in 1997,237 but perhaps there are reasons to believe that an
agency’s “hot hand” (that is, recent success in deploying Auer) is more
likely to activate the perverse incentives than any kind of general aware-
ness about Auer.
Using data collected by William Yeatman, I measured this hot-hand
treatment by computing agency-level win rates and Auer-related litigation
rates in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1993 through 2013.238 Do experi-
ences with Auer deference in real-world litigation affect agency rule writ-
ing down the road? In order to answer this question, I estimated models
of the effect of Auer case win rates, total Auer cases per year, and their
interaction on the indices of rule vagueness. Since rule writing takes
time—and the effects of one year’s litigation successes would not likely
235. Specifically, Table 2 reported a statistically significant shift in the trend line for
the laxity measure after Auer. See supra Table 2.
236. See Robert Rosenthal, The “File Drawer Problem” and Tolerance for Null Results,
86 Psychol. Bull. 638, 640 (1979) (discussing the problem that statistically nonsignificant
studies are not generally published, which could make erroneously significant studies appear
more credible than they actually are).
237. See supra Figures 1 & 2.
238. Yeatman, supra note 36, at 523–45 (discussing the methodology employed in
assembling the dataset). Because Yeatman’s data ran for only a subset of the years in my
data, and because many agencies never experienced Auer-related litigation during this
period, the models include only fifteen agencies. Moreover, because even agencies that did
experience Auer-related litigation did not litigate every year, the data were further limited to
just those agency-year pairs for which there was observable litigation.
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appear until the next year at the earliest—I estimated the models with
lags of one and two years. Table 5 reports the results.
Overall, the results show that Auer-related litigation successes do not
produce increases in rule vagueness in subsequent years, or at least not
increases that are statistically distinguishable from zero. Only two of the
models—the two-year lagged models of cognitive complexity and poly-
semy—show any statistically significant relationship, and only one of
these (polysemy) is consistent with the self-delegation thesis’s prediction
that greater exposure to Auer would trigger more vagueness. Moreover, it
is notable that the interaction of the agency’s win rate and the number of
cases in a given year—which represents the strongest possible measure of
“hot-hand” exposure to Auer’s incentives—is almost uniformly negatively
signed. That is, when agencies are winning a great deal of cases, they are,
if anything, writing more clearly in the year or two after. While these
findings on the interaction are not statistically significant, the negative
sign is inconsistent with the basic intuition of the self-delegation thesis.
TABLE 5: THE EFFECT OF AUER-RELATED LITIGATION SUCCESS ON
AGENCY RULE WRITING239
Legal
Vagueness Laxity
Cognitive
Complexity Polysemy
Win Rate
Lag 1 -.006 -.048 .154 .214
Lag 2 .056 -.136 -1.53^ .278**
# Cases
Lag 1 .004 .004 .184 .075
Lag 2 .026 -.067 -.283 .123*
Win Rate × # Cases
Lag 1 -.013 -.011 -.387 -.135
Lag 2 -.037 .085 .649 -.098
2. Sample Bias. — There are major advantages to limiting the sample
to economically significant rules. These are the rules that most affect
business and the public,240 and they are often new regulatory programs
rather than amendments to existing programs. Both of these factors
mean that there is greater potential for agencies to act on Auer’s perverse
239. Estimates are OLS with robust standard errors and agency-level fixed effects. “Lag
1” rows give coefficients from models estimated with one-year lags. “Lag 2” rows give
coefficients from models estimated with two-year lags. Statistical significance is denoted as
follows: p<.1 = ^, p<.05 = *, p<.01 = **, p<.001 = ***.
240. See Carey, supra note 169, at 12 (noting that economically significant rules might
be of “higher salience and political importance”).
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incentives—the agency is often writing on a blank slate in a policy arena
that is almost certainly important enough that the agency will have to
revisit it time and again. Beyond these substantive reasons for focusing
on economically significant rules, identifying and collecting the entire
population of economically significant rules for several decades is
relatively tractable, given that the White House Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs posts these data on its Reginfo.gov website.241
Notwithstanding the importance of rules deemed economically
significant, they are admittedly only a subset of all the rules agencies
promulgate every year.242 One notable difference between these two
categories of rules is that economically significant rules are vetted
extremely carefully relative to other significant rules because they require
a Regulatory Impact Analysis quantifying, to the extent possible, the costs
and benefits of both the regulation and its alternatives.243 It might be
reasonable to ask whether economically significant rules are less likely to
make it out of this process with unresolved ambiguities—the stakes are
simply too high, and the scrutiny too probing, to allow agencies to act on
even the strongest incentives from Auer.
To address this possibility, in a separate analysis I used a different
sampling strategy that brought so-called “other significant” rules into the
fold.244 But the results were similar to the null results for the economi-
cally significant rules.245 In this additional robustness analysis, I selected
three agencies with a high guidance-to-rulemaking ratio246—HHS, DOL,
and EPA—and collected all significant rules and proposed rules issued
from 2010 through 2016. I then tested whether these three agencies
altered their rule clarity following a series of Supreme Court cases
addressing Auer deference during this period. For each of these cases,
there were no statistically significant effects.247 Not only do these findings
confirm that economically significant rules are not a grossly distorted
subset of rules to look at for the main analysis, but they also reinforce the
findings above: There is no evidence that agencies have changed rule-
writing practices in response to Auer.
241. See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
242. See Carey, supra note 169, at 11 tbl.4 (comparing the total number of OIRA
reviews of economically significant rules and non-economically significant reviews from
1994 through 2015).
243. Office of Mgm’t & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-4, Regulatory
Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars/
a004/a-4.html [https://perma.cc/CVK3-GKVZ].
244. See Daniel E. Walters, Auer’s Incentives 26 (June 28, 2017) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This separate analysis was a pilot study for
the more extensive analysis in this Article.
245. Id. at 50.
246. Connor Raso’s work on guidance issuance in agencies allowed me to identify this
ratio. See Raso, supra note 127, at 813 tbl.3.
247. Walters, supra note 244, at 35.
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G. Summary of Empirical Findings
This Part has presented an extensive empirical analysis of the self-
delegation thesis. The empirical analysis of over 1,200 rules and 19 mil-
lion words of regulatory text fails to support the claim that agencies
respond to Auer by deliberately obfuscating regulations. The effects of
Auer on rule vagueness are either absent or, at least in the case of one
particular kind of vagueness (laxity), exactly the opposite of what the self-
delegation thesis would suggest. Moreover, these findings remain robust
even after looking at the data from a number of angles. The analysis
started with a basic statistical breakdown of the aggregate patterns, find-
ing that the aggregate trend appears to be toward greater rule clarity—a
challenge, at the very least, to the notion that agency behavior is becom-
ing more unconstrained. More nuanced empirical analyses of whether
salient moments in Auer’s development were pivot points, slowing down
or accelerating preexisting trends, also showed no evidence of any per-
verse effect. Finally, more agency-specific exposure to Auer deference, as
measured by win rates and number of cases invoking Auer, did not corre-
late with any decrease in clarity down the road. These results, if nothing
else, shift the burden in the debate over Auer. The self-delegation theory
has played a critical role in elevating the assault on Auer, but there simply
is no solid evidence to support it, and there even is some evidence to
refute it.
IV. PROBLEMATIZING THE SELF-DELEGATION THESIS
As discussed in Part II, Auer’s critics see agencies as having a self-
interested motive to maximize future interpretive discretion through the
kind of strategic sandbagging that Auer supposedly makes possible or
more attractive.248 In economic parlance, Auer is said to change the
expected utility of writing vague rules by making the payoff from reserv-
ing interpretive clarity for subsequent, less formal pronouncements more
248. This assumption that agencies will maximize their own self-interest (often against
the public interest) animates much economic, or “public choice,” scholarship on the
bureaucracy. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to
Improve Public Law 131–57 (1997) (“[A]gencies may appear to behave more like inde-
pendent entrepreneurs seeking funding from the Congress for projects of their own than
like well-instructed agents implementing their principal’s orders.”); André Blais & Stéphane
Dion, Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers? The Niskanean Model & Its Critics, 22 Polity
655, 656–63 (1990) (providing an overview of the public-choice model and the major criti-
cisms that have been raised in response); Spence & Cross, supra note 163, at 99 (sum-
marizing early public-choice scholarship that characterizes “agency bureaucrats as shirking,
self-interested budget-maximizers who thwart the will of the people and good govern-
ment”). Indeed, some argue that this assumption is the sine qua non of public-choice
scholarship. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 549, 563 (2002) (“Common to all analyses labeled
‘public choice’ is the core concept, taken from economic thought, of instrumental ration-
ality: The individual will order his behavior so as to maximize the likelihood of achieving
his individually defined goals.”).
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likely to materialize. The analysis in Part III, however, suggests that, if
agencies are indeed acting to maximize their self-interest, they are not
doing it by creating rules that are more vague, for there is no evidence
that Auer has perversely affected agency rule writing.
This seems to present a puzzle: If the incentives are so clear, why do
we not see any evidence that agencies follow through on them? In fact,
though, the incentives vis-à-vis the timing of interpretive clarity are not
clear, which is why the findings in Part III should not really come as any
surprise. The assumption that agencies invariably seek to maximize
discretion, while central to the self-delegation thesis, distorts the task of
rulemaking.249 In this task environment, discretion at some point down
the road will not always be perceived by agencies as a good on par with
certainty in the present moment.250 In short, the self-delegation thesis
overstates the case by oversimplifying the model parameters251 and ignor-
ing the real-world cognitive limits and institutional pressures that affect
agencies’ decision calculus and push them into present-mindedness. The
real-word complexities and uncertainties to which I refer are myriad, but
two are particularly noteworthy.
First, a longstanding research tradition—which the self-delegation
thesis sells short—shows that agencies, like individuals, are not likely to
make perfectly rational decisions all the time.252 Much institutionally
grounded research has shown that agencies are often boundedly
rational, meaning that their leaders and workers have cognitive biases
and tendencies that put a thumb on the scale in favor of attention to the
249. Cf. George A. Krause, Agency Risk Propensities Involving the Demand for
Bureaucratic Discretion, in Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific
Study of Bureaucracy 41, 48, 64 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (arguing
that the demand for discretion on the part of agencies is highly situational and that in
many instances, particularly those with endemic uncertainty, it would be expected that
agencies would reject additional discretion).
250. Id. at 48–50.
251. The model behind the self-delegation thesis is grounded in classical economic
models of rational choice that assume comprehensive rationality and “ends-means reason-
ing.” See Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public
Administration and Public Policy, 13 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 395, 397 (2003)
[hereinafter Jones, Bounded Rationality] (describing how advances in behavioral sciences
in the 1950s influenced political theorists who pushed back against the notion that organi-
zations engage in “fully rational decision making”). Although there is wide variation in the
rational-choice tradition across disciplines, scholarship in this vein tends to share common
features, including the assumptions that “decision-makers hold stable, ranked and ordered
preferences for outcomes” and that they possess the “necessary information to connect
choices to outcomes.” Bryan D. Jones et al., Behavioral Rationality and the Policy Processes:
Toward a New Model of Organizational Information Processing, in Handbook of Public
Policy 49, 51 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2006).
252. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making
Processes in Administrative Organizations 93–97 (1997) (describing the limitations of
“objective rationality” for developing models of administrative agency decisionmaking).
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more immediate effects of any decision.253 Existing research in cognitive
psychology and behavioral economics indicates that agencies are predis-
posed to be present-minded and to undervalue long-term opportuni-
ties. 254 Indeed, agency officials have an aversion to planning long
sequences of behavior because of the uncertainty that deferral creates.255
Yet planning a long sequence of actions is just what the self-delegation
thesis asserts that agencies do: They choose to forgo clarity now in order
to have greater discretion to be clearer and more specific at some later
time. The choices agencies make about the timing of interpretive clarity
are likely to be substantially colored by the cognitive limitations of agency
officials responsible for developing rules. Even if it is assumed that an
agency generally aims to maximize its discretion when writing rules,256
clear-eyed realism about the complexity and uncertainty of this task makes
it unsurprising that Auer has had no discernible effect on rule writing.257
253. Empirical scholarship on the bureaucracy—accumulated over the course of
decades—demonstrates that administrative agencies are boundedly rational “satisficers.”
See, e.g., Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics,
79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 755, 756 (1985) (describing a model for analyzing bureaucratic
politics, based on computer simulations, that assumes decisionmakers “mov[e] in
directions that appear to promise them greater utility,” without assuming that such
decisionmakers “optimize” or “carry out complex calculations”); Charles E. Lindblom,
The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79, 80–81 (1959) [hereinafter
Lindblom, Muddling Through] (arguing that the optimization model of agency behavior
“assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not
possess” and ignores that the “time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is
limited”); see also James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 169–71 (1958)
(arguing that organizations develop and use structural mechanisms to adapt to the bound-
aries of rationality).
254. See infra notes 272–274 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 275–279 and accompanying text.
256. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 488 (2002) (noting the widespread assump-
tion that “a rational agency will promote its interests by formulating a rule that comports
with the agency’s objectives to the greatest extent possible without going so far as to incite
the judicial or political branches to countermand it”).
257. Indeed, agencies often bind themselves to rules and norms that seem inexplicable
from a comprehensively rational, self-interested perspective. John Brehm & Scott Gates,
Working, Shirking, and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public 3 (1999)
(finding that, despite being basically unconstrained by superiors, rank-and-file bureaucrats
“for the most part are hard workers, motivated principally by . . . ‘functional’ preferences,
the extent to which bureaucrats feel rewarded by performing their job duties well”); see
also Elizabeth Magill, Foreword, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 899–
900 (2009) (describing the many ways that agencies take steps to constrain their discre-
tion, and arguing that these decisions to self-regulate are potentially revealing of what
makes agencies “tick”—that is, what motivates agencies). For a wonderful volume with
variations on this theme, see generally Administrative Law from the Inside Out: Essays on
Themes in the Work of Jerry L. Mashaw (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017). To be sure, the
rational-choice tradition does not act as if uncertainty does not exist. More recent rational-
choice scholarship folds uncertainty into an overall expected utility function wherein
“individuals form strategic preferences probabilistically” and then “compare the probability
that their most preferred outcome will occur against the possibility that their less preferred
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Second, Auer’s critics have also overlooked the many other factors
that further put a thumb on the scale in favor of front-loading regulatory
clarity, reinforcing a tendency that bounded rationality would already
lead agencies to have.258 For instance, future changes in politics and
resources cannot be predicted and create substantial pressure to lock in
meaning in clear legislative rules. While there are innumerable
uncertainties like these, one in particular should have stood out to
administrative law theorists. Hard look review under the APA’s arbitrary
and capricious standard is widely viewed as having had far-ranging effects
on how agencies write rules.259 Since the Supreme Court’s endorsement
of so-called hard look review in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,260 agencies by almost every account have
had strong incentives to build thorough rulemaking records that vet
every serious alternative and to support every choice with evidence.261 As
a result, agencies also have the incentive to speak with clarity. After all, it
is presumably close to impossible to be thorough in justification and
explanation yet vague in prescription. In some instances there are even
hard look cases that take issue with agencies’ failure to match rule
precision with a demonstrably complex problem.262 Hard look’s incen-
tives thus stand in considerable tension with many of Auer’s purported
incentives, and it should not be surprising that hard look review’s more
immediate incentives would tend to win out when agency officials
confront the problem of the timing of interpretive clarity.
This Part explains why the failure of any of the perverse effects
asserted by Auer’s critics to materialize should have been entirely pre-
dictable based on prior empirical institutional scholarship on bureaucratic
outcome will occur, and both against the cost of making a decision.” Jones et al., supra note
251, at 51. The difference with bounded rationality is simply one of degree: The theory
holds that “[b]ecause of human cognitive architecture, uncertainty is far more funda-
mental to choice than expected utility theory admits.” Id. at 55.
258. Judge Jane Stranch of the Sixth Circuit made this exact point in a recent
concurrence:
Finally, I am perplexed by the argument that Auer has led agencies
to regulate in a way that is broad and vague with, apparently, the goal of
creating maximum leeway to define the meaning of a regulation some-
where down the road. That claim assumes a world of political continuity
and agency longevity that we would be hard pressed to find today. It also
ignores multiple incentives and constraints. Consider the internal pres-
sures within the agency and throughout the governing executive branch
to implement the agency’s program and the external pressures from
those regulated and their lobbyists to obtain predictability, both of which
encourage clear regulations.
United States v. Havis, No. 17-5772, 2018 WL 5117187, at *7 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2018)
(Stranch, J., concurring).
259. See infra section IV.C.2.
260. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
261. See infra section IV.C.2.
262. See infra section IV.C.3.
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decisionmaking. Section IV.A reviews research in cognitive psychology,
behavioral law and economics, and public administration, highlighting
the ways that agency decisionmakers are generally thought to perceive
intertemporal uncertainties in deciding whether to maximize discretion
in decisionmaking. Section IV.B brings these insights to bear on the
particular problem that Auer presents for agencies (and that prompted
such widespread concern about Auer’s allegedly perverse incentives): the
question of the timing of interpretive clarity. On this question, the
presentist bias of bounded rationality suggests one compelling account
for the results reported in this Article. Finally, section IV.C provides an
additional explanation for why these results should not be at all
surprising: The threat of hard look review creates immediate incentives
for clarity in rule writing that can be expected to overwhelm any of Auer’s
purported incentives.
A. The Limits of Comprehensive Rationality in Administrative Agencies
The theory of bounded rationality “emerged as a critique of fully
rational decision making” and was motivated by Nobel laureate Herbert
Simon’s efforts to ground a theory of choice in “scientific principles of
observation and experiment rather than the postulation and deduction
characteristic of theoretical economics.” 263 Acknowledging the over-
whelming complexities that decisionmakers confront, as well as their
fundamentally limited capacity to understand and eliminate uncertain-
ties related to these complexities and to make tradeoffs among incom-
mensurable goods,264 bounded rationality predicts that decisionmakers
will often fail to maximize or optimize what might be objectively in their
long-term interest.265 Instead of maximizing their utility, decisionmakers
“satisfice”—“choos[ing] alternatives that are ‘good enough.’”266 More-
over, decisionmakers develop heuristics, or shortcuts, that help them pro-
cess the complexities of real-world decisionmaking but also often lead
them astray.267 We know, for instance, that decisionmakers filter and
263. Jones, Bounded Rationality, supra note 251, at 397.
264. Id. at 397–99; see also Jones et al., supra note 251, at 55 (“[B]ounded rationalists
argue that people find it difficult to trade off one goal against another when forming pref-
erences and making choices.” (citations omitted)).
265. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63
Psychol. Rev. 129, 136 (1956) (“Since the organism . . . has neither the senses nor the wits
to discover an ‘optimal’ path . . . we are concerned only with finding a choice mechanism
that will lead it to pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at some
specified level of all of its needs.”).
266. Jones, Bounded Rationality, supra note 251, at 399.
267. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2013) (providing an
overarching summary of research on heuristics). For applications of this research tradition
to administrative law, see Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 248, at 579 (arguing that the
detrimental effect of heuristic decisionmaking on administrative agencies may be muted as
compared to the effect on other governmental actors, due to the high level of expertise in
administrative bodies); Seidenfeld, supra note 256, at 529–43 (analyzing how the group-
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prioritize incoming information, selectively activate central and periph-
eral processing systems, and turn to previously discovered solutions
before initiating a “search” for new solutions.268 If a search is not acti-
vated, existing solutions, norms, and routines are usually sufficient, as
they offer “simplified models that capture the main features of a prob-
lem without capturing all its complexities.”269 These kinds of adaptive
cognitive infrastructures mean that “objective” information will rarely be
sufficient to predict behavior. As political scientist Bryan Jones has
explained, “People must adapt not just to the objective circumstances in
which they find themselves, but also to their own inner cognitive and
emotive constitutions.”270
Research in psychology and behavioral economics shows that a key
challenge for boundedly rational decisionmakers is intertemporal uncer-
tainty.271 Numerous studies have shown that decisionmakers engage in
“hyperbolic discounting,” wherein the discount applied to the value of a
long-term outcome grows nonlinearly as the time to reward increases.272
In other words, decisionmakers do not perceive long-term benefits the
same way that they perceive short-term benefits; typically, they overvalue
short-term benefits relative to equally attractive long-term payoffs. Were it
consistent and predictable, hyperbolic discounting might be easily recon-
ciled with comprehensive rationality through a uniform discount rate,
but the sheer number of behavioral anomalies that have been empirically
documented and the “spectacular variation” in discounting behavior sug-
gest a larger failure of economic modeling.273 Some of the better expla-
nations of the pervasive economic anomalies that economists have docu-
mented lie in cognition. That is, “temporal distance influences individu-
als’ responses to future events by systematically changing the way they
construe those events.”274
based context in which administrative decisionmaking occurs may either attenuate or
amplify heuristic biases).
268. Jones, Bounded Rationality, supra note 251, at 400.
269. March & Simon, supra note 253, at 169.
270. Bryan D. Jones, Politics and the Architecture of Choice 10 (2001) [hereinafter
Jones, Architecture of Choice].
271. See generally David L. Weimer, Behavioral Economics for Cost-Benefit Analysis:
Benefit Validity When Sovereign Consumers Seem to Make Mistakes 106–09 (2017)
(providing an overview of psychological research into deviations from the neoclassical model
of exponential discounting for intertemporal tradeoffs).
272. David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 445
(1997) (summarizing research on “[h]yperbolic discount functions” for the value of an
outcome which shows that decisionmaking is “characterized by a relatively high discount
rate over short horizons and a relatively low discount rate over long horizons”).
273. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. Econ. Literature 351, 352, 362–65 (2002)
(detailing “empirical regularities” that contradict the classical discounted-utility model).
274. Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 Psychol. Rev. 403, 403–
04 (2003) (showing that “individuals form more abstract representations, or high-level
construals, of distant-future events than near-future events,” with the practical effect that
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Organizations—both the institutions as a whole and the individuals
who compose them—have well-documented tendencies toward bound-
edly rational decisionmaking, and the evidence overall suggests that
government officials deal with the challenge of intertemporal uncer-
tainty, in particular, by focusing on short-term goals. For instance,
policymakers have been shown to rely on a “toolkit of loosely connected
heuristics” that collectively result in incremental policy adaptation.275
That is, they learn how to manage uncertainty and goal ambiguity by
proceeding in small, controllable steps.276 Drawing on past experience,
organizations adopt rules, routines, and processes that help reduce the
costs of analysis and further reinforce incremental adjustment.277 Bureau-
cratic organizations, in particular, put great faith in rules and established
practices even as new evidence suggests a need to adapt. 278 These
characteristics suggest a distinct tendency, both at the individual and
organizational level, for incremental adaptation over “plan[ning] long
behavior sequences.”279
In sum, the theory of bounded rationality suggests that there are
limits to the capacity of individuals and organizations to specify and pur-
sue their goals, especially over the long term, when faced with more
immediate consequences of their decisions.280 Within this environment
of limited capacity and scant resources to adapt, choice is structured by
cognitive heuristics, professional norms, and routines, some of which are
barely perceptible to the decisionmaker, let alone consciously chosen.281
“the value of outcomes is discounted or diminished as temporal distance from the outcomes
increases”).
275. Jonathan Bendor, Incrementalism: Dead yet Flourishing, 75 Pub. Admin. Rev.
194, 195 (2015).
276. See id. at 194–95 (explaining the applications and enduring legacy of Professor
Charles Lindblom’s theory of disjointed incrementalism); Charles E. Lindblom, Still
Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 Pub. Admin. Rev. 517, 517–18 (1979) (describing the
different analytical strategies and preferences associated with “incrementalism”).
277. James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen 58–59
(1994) (“Individuals and social systems depend on rules and on the standardization,
routinization, and organization of actions that they provide.”); Barbara Levitt & James G.
March, Organizational Learning, 14 Ann. Rev. Soc. 319, 323 (1988) (“[L]earning
produces increasing returns to experience . . . and leads an organization, industry, or
society to persist in using a set of procedures or technologies that may be far from
optimal.” (citation omitted)).
278. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do
It 59–65 (1989) (discussing the difficulty of enacting meaningful reform in “established
bureaucracies with strong professional traditions”).
279. Jones, Architecture of Choice, supra note 270, at 61.
280. March, supra note 277, at 9 (“Although decision makers try to be rational, they
are constrained by limited cognitive capabilities and incomplete information, and thus their
actions may be less than completely rational in spite of their best intentions and efforts.”).
281. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1124 (1974) (“[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values
to simpler judgmental operations.”); see also Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 248, at 555–
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Particularly when the choices involve complex tradeoffs over time,
organizations, including administrative agencies, can be expected to
engage in incremental decisionmaking that, by definition, sacrifices some
long-term benefits in order to secure immediate benefits.
The point of this discussion is not to demonstrate that bounded
rationality perfectly explains real-world behavior, or even necessarily to
dismiss nonbounded rationality at all.282 In some situations, particularly
those in which complexity and uncertainty are low, agency officials can
surely behave more like the archetypal homo economicus—specifying a
goal ex ante, considering large quantities of information and numerous
alternatives, and coming to a decision that maximizes goal attainment.
The point is simply that the widely acknowledged constraints of bounded
rationality cannot be ignored when theorizing about administrative
behavior. As Professor Mark Seidenfeld has observed, the assumption
that agencies are comprehensively rational utility maximizers is “not so
much wrong as incomplete”: “[I]ncentives, whether applied to an institu-
tion like an agency or to individuals, matter,” but they “are not the only
things that matter.”283 The next section explains why the choice that
agencies face in deciding whether to provide rule clarity now or later is
one that is particularly understandable from the standpoint of bounded
rationality.
B. Bounded Rationality’s Impact on the Timing of Interpretive Clarity in
Administrative Action
After Congress delegates to agencies the authority to interpret stat-
utes and make policy, agencies must decide not only the what of policy,
but also the when. Most obviously, they have to decide when to act rather
56 (describing how “people rely on two primary strategies to make the most of their cogni-
tive abilities,” namely relying on “mental shortcuts” and on “organizing principles” that
“consist of a scripted set of default information and organizational themes that help people
focus on the information most likely to be relevant”).
282. Neither is the aim to defend bounded rationality and incrementalism as a pre-
scriptive theory. Much of the debate over Lindblom’s The Science of “Muddling Through”
concerned whether Lindblom’s theory was defensible as a prescriptive theory, rather than
a merely descriptive one. See Lindblom, Muddling Through, supra note 253. The domi-
nant prescriptive theory in administrative law has historically been a more rational-
comprehensive theory emphasizing cost-benefit analysis and other analytical methods and
requirements. But, citing Lindblom, some administrative law scholars are now urging the
benefits of an incrementalist approach. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Risk
Regulation at Risk: Restoring a Pragmatic Approach 22–27 (2003) (arguing that admin-
istrative law has shifted toward a paradigm of “comprehensive analytical rationality,” and
that this framework should be rejected in favor of a pragmatic attitude characterized by
incrementalist experimentation); Wagner et al., Dynamic Rulemaking, supra note 110, at
229–32 (noting that incrementalism “has fallen out of favor as a prescriptive model for
policymaking in recent decades,” but that it “may nevertheless be advantageous under
conditions of limited knowledge and political conflict”).
283. Seidenfeld, supra note 256, at 488.
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than demur.284 But the when also comes into play even when agencies
decide to act. That is because agencies can act now with the expectation
that it will be their final statement, or they can save some interpretive
clarity or specificity for later.285 The self-delegation thesis can be under-
stood simply as a hypothesis that the existence of Auer deference alters
the expected utility of aiming for greater clarity in the future rather than
in the present.
The framework of bounded rationality can help us to understand
why, contrary to the expectations of the self-delegation thesis, agencies
might exhibit a distinct bias toward front-loading interpretive clarity, Auer
notwithstanding.286 Choices about the timing of interpretive clarity pose
an extraordinarily complex set of questions for agencies, and consciously
opting to play the long game introduces yet more complexity and uncer-
tainty. If, as bounded rationality would suggest, agencies do not have the
capacity to comprehensively trace out every future contingency involved
in deferring some questions and to optimize a strategy to maximize their
utility, they are more likely to satisfice by doing the best they can in the
present to pursue their goals.287
As agencies navigate the choice between providing more clarity now
or later, they also cannot avoid confronting a task environment of
284. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory
State: Theory and Evidence, 68 Admin. L. Rev. 93, 93–95 (2016) (synthesizing “an in-
depth set of discussions” with “scholars, practitioners, and government officials to discuss
agenda-setting in the regulatory process”); Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays:
How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of
Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1381, 1388 (2011) (reconceiving agency
delay “as a principal-agent problem between congressional enacting coalitions and the
agency”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies
Defer Decisions, 103 Geo. L.J. 157, 158 (2014) (“Every day of every year, administrative
agencies must decide what and whether to decide.”).
285. The Chenery doctrine affords agencies broad authority to choose when to provide
clarity by giving agencies the prerogative to make policy via prospective rulemaking or iter-
ative adjudication. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (holding that “the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency”).
286. Sunstein and Vermeule might suggest that the analysis in this section commits the
sign fallacy. See Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 309. If the
theoretical account offered here were without the empirical analysis in Part III, this would
perhaps be a problem. Part III, though, shows not only that there is no evidence to sup-
port the self-delegation thesis but also that, on one measure, agencies have increased the
clarity of their writing. This is entirely consistent with the account of bounded rationality
in Part IV.
287. Note, as well, that the predictions from a comprehensive-rationality framework
are observationally equivalent when uncertainty is high—in both cases the agency will
choose to forgo some future discretion. See Krause, supra note 249, at 48 (modeling the
“agency preference for more, less, or the same level of discretion in response to a change in
policy outcome uncertainty at a given (fixed) level of agency utility”). Bounded rationality
helps explain why agencies may overestimate the uncertainty, feeding the impulse to speak
clearly in rules.
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uncertainty and complexity. The major uncertainties that exist—goal
ambiguity and tactical uncertainty—each increase the relevance of more
immediate and concrete concerns and deter agencies from planning
long sequences of behavior as part of a comprehensive strategy.
1. Goal Ambiguity. — One form of uncertainty is goal or task ambigu-
ity. Agency officials may not actually have a clear idea of what it is that
they want to accomplish in the long run when they act.288 At a minimum,
it will probably be much more challenging to have clarity over longer-
term goals than shorter-term ones. Goal uncertainty is already pervasive
in administrative rulemaking and can seriously affect the rulemaking
task. 289 Some of this ambiguity stems from multiple, conflicting
delegations,290 as well as from jurisdictional overlaps and the constant
pull of multiple political principals.291 Much of it, however, is simply
inherent in the highly complex process of policymaking, in which agency
officials are forced to act before they have fully formed and specified
objectives,292 all in the face of significant public pressures to pursue
particular goals.293
In some sense, agency officials who are completely uncertain of their
goals cannot even begin to think about acting strategically with respect to
the timing of interpretive clarity. 294 Less radical uncertainty about
288. See Bendor & Moe, supra note 253, at 771 (offering a dynamic model of bureau-
cratic goal adaptation).
289. See, e.g., Christopher Carrigan, Structured to Fail? Regulatory Performance Under
Competing Mandates 52–82 (2017) (discussing goal ambiguity and its relationship with
regulatory performance); Jung Wook Lee, Hal G. Rainey & Young Han Chun, Goal
Ambiguity, Work Complexity, and Work Routineness in Federal Agencies, 40 Am. Rev. Pub.
Admin. 284, 284–86 (2010) (collecting sources documenting the presence and effect of
goal ambiguity in federal agency rulemaking).
290. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2009) (discussing the “ubiquity” of
multiple-goal agencies—for example, the National Park Service, which is “required both
to protect the natural resources of the parks and to develop facilities for visitors”).
291. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 184 (2011)
(discussing the problem of duplicative delegations and describing the “antiduplication insti-
tutions” that have emerged endogenously to help smooth over potential conflicts between
agencies); Michael M. Ting, A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignment in Bureaucracies, 46
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 364, 366 (2002) (outlining a positive explanation of the existence of dupli-
cative delegations).
292. See Biber, supra note 290, at 9–13 (deriving insights into agency incentives from
economic models of principal–agent relationships, under which agencies are forced to
produce results at the principal’s pace).
293. See Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of
Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. Pub. Admin. Res. &
Theory 103, 117–19 (2005) (analyzing the impact of public comments on the content of
agency rules).
294. Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 164 (2015)
(“If the goals of governance are up for grabs[,] . . . this renders the project of governance
inherently unstable. Where a policy’s meta-goal includes modification of its first order
priorities, it risks proceeding without a compass.” (footnote omitted)).
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overarching goals might clear the way for more strategic consideration of
the timing question, but as it is, we would expect boundedly rational
agencies—torn between these sometimes confusing pushes and pulls—to
err on the side of what they can control and measure with greater cer-
tainty.295 What to do in the short term will almost inevitably be more cer-
tain, particularly in the constantly changing world of executive-branch
politics. With new administrations or changes in the balance of political
power in Washington come new goals that agencies can only faintly imag-
ine, let alone act on with any precision.
2. Tactical Uncertainty. — Assuming that goal ambiguity is overcome
and an agency has determined that more discretion down the road (and
less clarity now) will better advance its goals, an agency still faces signifi-
cant tactical complexities in executing a self-delegation strategy that will
unfold over time. Many of these complexities are also captured by mod-
els of how government decisionmakers deal with uncertainty by choosing
whether to build “dynamic” elements into their rules. Facing a choice
between “static law,” which “intend[s] for the intervention to remain
fixed, making no special allowances that could facilitate a future
modification,”296 and “dynamic law,” which involves deliberately setting
the stage for future revision,297 agencies are forced to cope with the
often-excessive cost of planning for, and monitoring over, the longer
term.
The conscious attempt to save some opportunity for greater clarity
or specification at some later time is analogous to a choice about how
many contingencies to account for in a rule, and it is therefore subject to
many of the same costs and risks.298 For instance, agencies that engage in
strategic deferral or self-delegation would have to commit, ex ante, to a
number of subsequent actions. But there is no guarantee that there will
be resources to carry out these subsequent actions299 or that responsibil-
ity for those subsequent actions will not be given to other actors who do
not share the same long-term vision. This is a particularly salient
295. See Biber, supra note 290, at 12 (“Where an agency is faced with multiple goals, it
will tend to overproduce on the goals that are complements and the goals that are easily
measured, and it will tend to underproduce on the goals that are substitutes and the goals
that are hard to measure.”); Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public
Sector: An Interpretive Review, 37 J. Hum. Resources 696, 715–16 (2002) (noting that
“incentives will be generally weaker” in situations of multiple goals and multiple princi-
pals, and that “in their day-to-day operations, agencies will think not in terms of the multiple
and vague ultimate goals, but in terms of a smaller number of immediate and measurable
tasks”).
296. Pidot, supra note 294, at 131.
297. See id. at 140–41.
298. See Diver, supra note 128, at 67–79 (arguing that the “optimal” precision of rules
is determined by tradeoffs between three incommensurable goals).
299. David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement,
93 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 14 n.33 (2014) (noting that “lack of clarity leads to delays and increases
in transaction costs” when it comes to enforcement).
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consideration for agency leaders, as the average tenure of political
appointees is around two years.300 Similarly, even if the tenure of an
agency leader lasts longer than that, external political circumstances may
change, making it more difficult to do in the future precisely what that
leader might have intended in the present.301
Finally, there are back-end risks related to potential vetoes of subse-
quent enforcement actions. For instance, in certain cases courts have
blocked subsequent enforcement when an agency’s lack of clarity failed
to provide fair notice from the rule itself that conduct was prohibited.302
Interest group mobilization could also block implementation and updat-
ing.303 In sum, as Professor Justin Pidot explains, “Creating dynamic
regulation is an inherently complex task that requires lawmakers to con-
sider more than the immediate government action at hand.”304 Front-end
clarity, like a decision to write “static law,” is in fact best understood as a
default strategy for coping with these costs and uncertainties.
Front-end clarity has its own costs, to be sure, and deferral of such
clarity might yield certain benefits, even if they are somewhat hard to pre-
dict.305 Bounded rationality does not deny that the costs and benefits of
agency decisions are, in principle, measurable. The key takeaway,
though, is that the simple act of thinking through these costs and
300. Raso, supra note 127, at 803; see also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices:
Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 913, 919 n.23 (2009) (collecting
sources measuring the average tenure of political appointees).
301. Elections can fundamentally change the enforcement priorities, leaving an agency
engaged in a self-delegation strategy high and dry. See Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation
Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 795, 812 (2010) (describing the ways that an
incoming administration can, with relative ease, reverse the previous administration’s
enforcement policies).
302. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding
that—given the “lack of clarity in the regulations” promulgated by EPA, combined with a
subsequent agency policy statement that did not adequately address the contested issue—
General Electric was not fairly put on notice that its chemical distillation process violated
EPA regulations).
303. See Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who
Loses, and Why 40 (2009) (describing the disproportionate ability of entrenched interests
to mobilize to protect the regulatory status quo); Pidot, supra note 294, at 118–19
(arguing that “political and legal forces invested in the status quo” often obstruct progress
in agency policymaking); Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-
Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. Pub. Admin
Res. & Theory 373, 374 (2012) (theorizing that interest group lobbying “play[s] a key role
during the pre-proposal stage” of agency rulemaking and that these groups’ influence
“manifests itself through both agenda building and agenda blocking”).
304. Pidot, supra note 294, at 175.
305. See, e.g., Joel A. Mintz, “Running on Fumes”: The Development of New EPA
Regulations in an Era of Scarcity, 46 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,510, 10,516 (2016) (discussing how
program offices at EPA display a “preference for satisfying stakeholders,” and that, as a result,
they “sometimes display a ‘passion for ambiguity’” as a means to “serve a program office’s
goal of playing conflicting interests against one another and avoiding outside pressures
and subsequent legal challenges” (quoting an anonymous former EPA official)).
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benefits is taxing, and agency officials likely do not have the resources or
the time to thoroughly study each factor that might bear on the decision.
If agencies navigate the choice of the timing of interpretive clarity in a
boundedly rational manner, it becomes understandable that, on balance,
“ambiguities are a threat at least as much as they are an opportunity” for
agencies.306
3. Professional Norms and Mission Focus. — Agency staff may also be
disinclined to take on the unnecessary risk of failure that accompanies a
self-delegation strategy. This disinclination follows partly from the find-
ings on risk-averse behavior in prospect theory: “[I]n the domain of
gains people value certain gains over possible gains.”307 That is, the possi-
ble payoff of the self-delegation strategy is hard for agencies to value
properly because it is uncertain to materialize.308 Beyond this general fea-
ture of individual and organizational decisionmaking under uncertainty,
a great deal of research on the bureaucracy shows that career-level
bureaucrats are motivated by professional norms and the agency’s mis-
sion, which likely leads bureaucrats to overvalue the certain win gained by
having promulgated a comprehensive rule.309 Political scientists John
Brehm and Scott Gates show that “organizational culture” develops, in
essence, from the ground up, as “uncertain individuals look[] to fellow
subordinates for appropriate responses.”310 This organic development of
organizational culture is generalizable as well: In an extensive survey of
bureaucratic preferences, Brehm and Gates find that bureaucrats “prefer
work and serving the public” over sabotage, shirking, and self-interested
utility maximization.311 For some, these features of the career civil ser-
vice—the “neutral expertise” promoted by professional commitments
and the “other-regarding” motivations of bureaucrats—are part of what
generates administrative legitimacy “from the inside-out.”312 On the other
306. Sunstein & Vermeule, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 16, at 309.
307. Jones et al., supra note 251, at 57.
308. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 265–69 (1979) (developing a theory of behavior under
which people systematically overweight outcomes that will certainly occur over outcomes
that are uncertain to occur); see also supra notes 272–274 and accompanying text (review-
ing the literature on hyperbolic discounting and intertemporal uncertainty).
309. For instance, Herbert Kaufman’s classic study of the Forest Service documents
one particularly strong instance of a mission orientation in a federal agency, prompted in
part by Forest Service Chief Gifford Pinchot’s brilliant decision to institute an agency-wide
education program to inculcate shared values. See Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger:
A Study in Administrative Behavior 85–86 (1960).
310. Brehm & Gates, supra note 257, at 194.
311. Id. at 196.
312. See, e.g., Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment
of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev.
463, 465, 470–71 (2012) (arguing for a move to a “deliberative-constitutive paradigm” that
“embraces, rather than rejects, the professionalism of agency staff,” viewing it as a “positive
attribute that helps ensure the integration of technical expertise in rulemaking and serves
as a buffer against undue influence by highly interested stakeholders”); see also Emily
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hand, as others have noted, one result of this institutionalization of
professional norms in agency policymaking is that agencies “at times fix-
ate on particular missions, even when the principal has expanded the
number of goals the agency is supposed to take into account.”313
The professional commitments and investment in the mission of the
agency are widely thought to interact with an uncertain task environment
to produce fundamentally conservative, risk-averse behavior on the part
of bureaucrats. Rule writers that are invested in the purposes of rulemak-
ing are more likely to focus on the relatively certain gains for their pro-
gram that can come from rule clarity today than on the nebulous pros-
pect of enhancing their discretion down the road.
C. Satisficing Rule Writers and the Shadow of State Farm
Boundedly rational actors’ aversion to long-term strategy offers a
ready explanation for why Auer would never be expected to have
discernible behavioral consequences for rule writing. But these tenden-
cies are only reinforced by the weight of other core features of
administrative law. From the standpoint of the typical government lawyer,
an agency’s primary short-term concern is crafting a legally defensible
rule. This means crafting a rule that can survive hard look review in fed-
eral court, where the court will review the rule and its underlying record
to ensure that the decision is thoroughly analyzed and responsive to a
wide range of perspectives.314 These requirements make it necessary to
seek to provide clarity in regulatory language.
1. Hard Look Review Basics. — Hard look review developed in the
1970s out of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 706(2)(A) of
the APA in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.315 Elaborating on
the Court’s reading of the arbitrary and capricious standard in Overton
Park,316 D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal wrote that a court should
exercise its role with “particular vigilance if it ‘becomes aware, especially
Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building
Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 354 (2013) (noting that
“[a]gency culture and professionalism can serve as internal legitimizers for agency behavior”
due in part to their promotion of “neutral expertise”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F.
Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-
Out, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 577, 578 (2011) (arguing that administrative law scholarship
often ignores research in public administration that displays the “other-regarding motives”
of career-level bureaucrats).
313. Biber, supra note 290, at 17.
314. The literature is replete with treatments of hard look review, with most focusing
on whether hard look review serves to improve the regulatory process by requiring agencies
to furnish reasoned analysis to support decisions. For a comprehensive overview of both
the doctrine and the debates about it, see generally Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk:
Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 621 (1994).
315. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (describing an agency’s duty under the arbitrary and
capricious standard to conduct a “searching and careful” inquiry).
316. Id.
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from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really
taken a “hard look” at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.’”317
The precise contours of hard look review are difficult to pin down,318
in part because it developed iteratively in the D.C. Circuit over many
years, and also because it is composed of a “concert” of goals, including
promoting detailed explanations from agencies, encouraging agencies to
respond to salient comments and perspectives, requiring consistency
over time, and requiring adequate reasons to justify an agency deci-
sion.319 The most definitive statement came from the Supreme Court’s
ruling in State Farm, in which the Court vacated the decision of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rescind a
previously promulgated seat-belt standard applicable to new motor vehi-
cles.320 The standard had required the installation of either automatic
seat belts or airbags in all new vehicles.321 In rescinding the standard,
NHTSA argued that it could not “reliably predict[] that the Standard
would lead to any significant increased usage of restraints,” and in light
of the costs of compliance, decided to change course.322 The Court
found NHTSA’s evidence wanting. NHTSA had not explained the basis
of its belief that passengers would disengage automatic seat belts,323 and
it did not provide any analysis of an obvious alternative to requiring auto-
matic seat belts: simply mandating the installation of airbags.324 In reject-
ing NHTSA’s reasoning, the Court articulated particularly broad con-
tours of arbitrariness review. Agency action is invalid
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view
or the product of agency expertise.325
317. Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1974) (emphasis added by Leventhal) (quoting Greater Bos.
Television Corp. v. Fed Commc’ns Comm’n, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
318. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Special Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative
Law, 90 Geo. L.J. 779, 786 (2002) (describing hard look review as “notoriously malleable”).
319. See Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and
Administrative Law, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 51, 52 (1984) (outlining courts’ “efforts to
police and discipline the administrative process”).
320. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56–57
(1983).
321. Id. at 37.
322. Id. at 39.
323. Id. at 51–57.
324. Id. at 46–51.
325. Id. at 43.
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The State Farm decision—both in terms of the standard enunciated
and the “rather strict judicial scrutiny”326 the Court actually exercised in
probing the agency’s justifications—indicated the Court’s strong
approval of much of the D.C. Circuit’s substantive hard look doctrine.
Not surprisingly, State Farm was then followed by a number of high-profile
court decisions vacating agency rules under the hard look doctrine.327
Today, courts subject agency decisions to extremely stringent analysis,
often almost stochastically so,328 meaning that agencies have reason to
make their rules hard look–proof even though most will not be thor-
oughly audited.
2. Hard Look’s Effect on Agency Behavior. — By most accounts, the
threat of hard look review has had a rippling effect on every aspect of the
rule-formation process.329 Agencies cannot be sure of the “precise scope
or intensity of that review process,” but they can loosely predict that
potential challengers, in order to maximize the chances of successful
challenge, will search for “issues of such importance that the agency
arguably should have discussed them more thoroughly or in greater
detail.”330 Agencies acting in the shadow of State Farm are said to “make
every effort to ensure a thorough record that can withstand review the
first time around” despite this substantial uncertainty.331 Thus, the incen-
tives widely accepted as having been created by hard look review should
be clear to agencies: Leave no rock unturned in the administrative rec-
ord; address every argument and counterargument, however small; hew
closely to statutory criteria; and, perhaps most importantly, leverage
326. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev.
363, 387 (1986).
327. See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 393, 412 (2000) (discussing the impact of hard
look review on the outcomes of challenges to agency regulations and noting that the D.C.
Circuit vacated a majority of challenged rules after State Farm).
328. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 53–54 (2008) (arguing that Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007), which expanded the scope of hard look review to agencies’ “discretionary
decisions not to promulgate regulations,” could be “State Farm for a new generation”). At
least one study has shown that arbitrariness review is often driven more by the political
preferences of the reviewing panel of judges than by anything substantive. See, e.g., Thomas
J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761,
767 (2008).
329. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1419–20 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity, Deossifying] (noting
the “resource-intensive” and “time-consuming” processes agencies must engage in under
the threat of hard look review).
330. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L.
Rev. 59, 69 (1995).
331. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial
Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 733, 750–51 (2011) (citing
McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 329, at 1400–01).
158 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:85
agency expertise by populating the record with substantial scientific and
technical evidence.
There is no shortage of evidence that agencies have taken such steps
in response to the threat of hard look review. First, as a burgeoning litera-
ture on rulemaking “ossification” has posited, the stringency of review
may prompt agencies to issue fewer rules than they otherwise might.332
Instead of employing rulemaking as a first-best option, agencies are
thought to have shifted their energies to nonrulemaking channels such
as adjudications and nonlegislative rules to avoid costly vacaturs.333 The
evidence of such an effect is concededly somewhat equivocal, as a num-
ber of recent empirical studies of rulemaking activities suggest that hard
look review is not responsible for any change in the volume or pace of
rulemaking.334 Second, while there is, to date, no systematic empirical
analysis of agencies’ record-building behavior after State Farm, “it seems a
matter of common sense that agencies are mindful of the possibility of
judicial review for major rulemakings and would therefore approach
rulemaking more deliberately.” 335 As Professor Wendy Wagner has
332. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 257, 262–63 (1987) (arguing that judicial review of
motor vehicle safety standards prompted NHTSA to abandon rulemaking in favor of a
recall-based strategy of regulation). Note also that ossification is really a two-fold concept,
and some scholarship views ossification as primarily slowing the promulgation of rules
rather than stopping it entirely. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, Rulemaking
Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1493, 1493 (2012) [hereinafter Pierce, Jr., Ossification Is Real] (defining ossification to
mean “that it takes a long time and an extensive commitment of agency resources to use
the notice and comment process to issue a rule”).
333. See, e.g., Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 332, at 263 (“Since the mid-1970’s,
NHTSA has instead concentrated on its alternative statutory power to force the recall of
motor vehicles that contain ‘defects’ related to safety performance. It has thus retreated to
a traditional form of case-by-case adjudication . . . .”); McGarity, Deossifying, supra note
329, at 1385–96 (noting that “[f]rustrated agencies” have begun to explore methods of
“avoiding notice-and-comment rulemaking altogether,” opting instead for adjudications
and “nonrule rulemaking”); Pierce, Jr., Ossification Is Real, supra note 332, at 1502
(explaining how, during the 2008 financial crisis, the Treasury Department and Federal
Reserve Board identified “old statutory provisions” that would allow them to take “expe-
ditious actions” without the burden of “comply[ing] with mandatory decisionmaking
procedures”).
334. See Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 1111, 1127 (“The empirical evidence for a retreat from rulemaking in the face of
stringent judicial review is not nearly as clear as has been generally supposed.”);
O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking, supra note 131, at 963–64 (arguing that the
relatively high number of notices of proposed rulemakings from 1983 to 2002 suggests
that the costs to rulemaking are not as high as feared); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory
Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1414, 1467 (2012) (“[A]gencies—
and in particular, DOI agencies—do not appear to have abandoned notice and comment
wholesale, either by failing to regulate entirely, or by embracing surreptitious forms of
regulation.”).
335. Meazell, supra note 331, at 751.
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argued, the hard look doctrine would seem to encourage agencies to
“load their rule and record with details and defensive statements” to the
point of “defensive overkill.”336
Agencies that write a lot of rules have generally invested in an
institutional infrastructure that helps them facilitate a response to the
prospect of judicial review. Professor Thomas McGarity, more than any-
body else, has given significant attention to the way rulemaking processes
are structured, and what he describes as the “team model” that agencies
usually employ seems tailor-made to respond to the threat of hard look
review.337 Rather than allowing one insulated program office to draft a
rule in its entirety and elevate it for final approval (what McGarity calls
the “assembly line” model), agencies employing the team model seek to
draw out a “bureaucratic pluralism” that “transcends the knowledge and
experience of any individual person or office within the agency.”338 This
process aims to ensure, in accordance with hard look review’s manifest
goals, that every possible angle receives some attention in the process.339
According to McGarity, lawyers have come to play an especially
important role in this process, “advising the relevant agency decision-
makers on the many aspects of the rule that might be challenged in
336. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture,
59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1357–59 (2010). Of course, in principle, the information-forcing role
of hard look review is often cited as a positive one, notwithstanding Wagner’s cogent argu-
ment that the effects are often overkill. See Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “with Teeth”:
Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589,
1605 (2014) (concluding that “[t]here is little doubt that judicial review plays a significant
information-forcing role”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of
“Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 755–56 (2006) (“[J]udicially-imposed
explanation requirements can help reviewing courts overcome their comparative informa-
tional disadvantage for reasons that are independent of the (in)ability of courts to under-
stand or verify the substantive content of the justifications advanced by government
decisionmakers.”).
337. See generally Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 57, 90–94 [hereinafter McGarity, Internal
Structure] (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of a model of agency policymaking
in which the basic “decisionmaking unit” is composed of “representatives from all of the
institutional subunits within the agency”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government
Attorneys in Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter & Spring
1998, at 19, 20–21 [hereinafter McGarity, Role of Government Attorneys] (describing that,
in the team model, all tasks associated with rule drafting, promulgation, and legal defense
“are delegated to a ‘team’ or ‘work group’ composed of representatives from all of the
agency subunits that have an interest in the outcome of the rulemaking process”).
338. McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 337, at 61.
339. See id. at 90–91 (noting that an advantage of the team model is that it
encourages “innovative, cross-disciplinary thinking” from people with “divergent
professional perspectives”). These processes are a prime example of the kind of rules,
norms, and processes that boundedly rational agencies employ to cope with uncertainty.
See supra section IV.B.2.
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court.”340 Enforcement staff, for their part, have perhaps the strongest
interest in promoting clarity in the regulatory text, as that can greatly
improve the enforceability of the rule down the road (with or without the
benefit of Auer deference).341 In their role as “scrivener,” agency lawyers
are said to be pivotally involved in the process of “achiev[ing] clarity in
the wording of the rule,” in “provid[ing] adequate references to the rec-
ord in support of the agency’s resolution of major issues,” and in “main-
tain[ing] a consistent line of reasoning throughout.”342 The stochasticity
of hard look review has apparently increased this role for lawyers in the
agency at the expense of program and policy offices. 343 Indeed,
Professors Emily Hammond and David Markell recently documented law-
yerly meticulousness in a context practically devoid of judicial review—
EPA’s processing of petitions to withdraw states’ authority to administer
environmental programs that had been delegated as part of cooperative
federalism—prompting them to query “whether EPA has so internalized
the expectation of judicial review that it treats even informal matters
according to the norms resulting from hard-look review.”344
If agencies “are constantly ‘looking over their shoulders’ at the
reviewing courts,”345 it stands to reason that these same agencies do not
have their eyes on a very different ball: that is, the long-term possibility of
gaining strategic advantage by self-delegating through vague rules. The
costs of vacatur or remand of a rule are tangible; the benefits of self-
delegation are speculative. If agencies really are satisficers, and if they are
listening to the voices of their legal advisors who tell them that judicial
review is likely, they will focus most of their attention on addressing that
risk. In addressing the risk of hard look review, agencies will of necessity
seek to reduce vagueness. In short, hard look review “requires federal
agencies to fully explain their decisions at the outset, favoring a front-
loaded decision process that culminates in a single record of decision
that allows for judicial review.”346
340. McGarity, Role of Government Attorneys, supra note 337, at 22; see also Mintz,
supra note 305, at 10,517 (noting that Office of General Counsel attorneys at EPA “some-
times attempt to eliminate unenforceable language in proposed regulations,” but con-
cluding that their concern with enforceability is not sufficient to eliminate all ambigu-
ities); Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and
Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 Admin. L. Rev. 549, 566
(1989) (noting that lawyers often “have the last word” in rulemaking).
341. McGarity, Internal Structure, supra note 337, at 62 (noting that enforcement
professionals “are primarily concerned with the degree to which . . . regulated [entities]
adhere to agency commands,” and therefore push the agency to “articulate its rules in
unambiguous ways” that put regulated parties on notice and minimize their ability to
“avoid compliance through interpretational loopholes”).
342. McGarity, Role of Government Attorneys, supra note 337, at 26.
343. Id. at 26–27.
344. Hammond & Markell, supra note 312, at 355.
345. McGarity, Deossifying, supra note 329, at 1412.
346. Pidot, supra note 294, at 170 (footnote omitted).
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3. Hard Look’s Effects on Regulatory Precision. — Apart from inducing a
generalized institutional response, the threat of hard look review can be
expected to have systemic effects on rule-writing style, presumably
favoring clarity over vagueness. 347 Hard look review’s pressure on
agencies to seek regulatory clarity would seem to stem from at least three
possible factors.
First, hard look challenges sometimes come packaged as claims that
rule text is not clear enough.348 In an early hard look case in 1971,
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, the D.C. Circuit held that
“[c]ourts should require administrative officers to articulate the stan-
dards and principles that govern their discretionary decisions in as much
detail as possible.”349 While this emphasis on clarity may not appear as
frequently in more recent cases, the principle in Ruckelshaus has never
been rejected.350 And it does still arise. More recently, the Ninth Circuit,
in vacating a decision to delist the Yellowstone grizzly bear population as
a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, rejected “out of
hand” the suggestion that a vague promise to relist the species if circum-
stances change could “operate as a reasonable justification for delisting”
without the benefit of any specific “management responses” and “spe-
cific triggering criteria.”351
Litigants often pair the claim that a rule violates the arbitrary and
capricious standard with a claim that the rule violates due process by
being “too vague to warn the industry of the scope of prohibited con-
duct.”352 Typically, these challenges are brought after an agency attempts
to enforce a vague rule, and in these cases, the courts occasionally vacate
347. See Blake Emerson & Cheryl Blake, Admin. Conference of the U.S., Plain
Language in Regulatory Drafting 14–19 (2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Plain%20Language%20in%20Regulatory%20Drafting_Draft%20Report_Sept%
206_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSP6-9QKU] (reporting interview-based evidence that
agencies aim for clarity in part due to the threat of judicial review).
348. See, e.g., Copar Pumice Co. v. Tidwell, 603 F.3d 780, 800 (10th Cir. 2010) (“We
also reject Copar’s argument that by including the term ‘verifiable proof’ in the Notice of
Noncompliance, the [Forest Service] imposed a vague standard.”); Ariz. Cattle Growers’
Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1251 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Based upon the lack of
an articulated, rational connection between Condition 1 and the taking of species, as well
as the vagueness of the condition itself, we hold that its implementation was arbitrary and
capricious.”).
349. 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 438 F.3d 1184,
1194 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that an agency “proceeding on a case-by-case basis” need
only “pour ‘some definitional content’ into a vague statutory term” to survive an arbi-
trariness challenge (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).
350. See Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 448 F.3d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating
in dicta that Ruckelshaus’s statement about the vagueness of rules “may well be an overly
broad statement of judicial review, even under the APA, and inconsistent with our more
modest jurisprudence in subsequent decades,” but stopping short of rejecting the principle
outright).
351. Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).
352. E.g., CPC Int’l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1052 (8th Cir. 1975).
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agency action based either on Fifth Amendment due process grounds or
on arbitrary and capricious grounds. For instance, in Pearson v. Shalala,
the D.C. Circuit agreed with the challengers that “the APA requires the
agency to explain why it rejects their proposed health claims,” and
“do[ing] so adequately necessarily implies giving some definitional con-
tent to the phrase ‘significant scientific agreement.’”353 For the court,
“this proposition is squarely rooted in the prohibition under the APA
that an agency not engage in arbitrary and capricious action.”354 How-
ever, with striking frequency, these kinds of claims are also brought in
preenforcement review of rules.355 These kinds of claims are surely far
more numerous than they are successful,356 but the claims are not frivo-
lous enough that they do not warrant a response, which means agencies
attuned to the possibility of undergoing probing review by courts will pre-
sumably take few chances and will have short-term reasons to try to make
their rules clear. After all, with the availability of preenforcement review
of agency rules, the shadow of review need not be very long and can be
formative for agency behavior.
Second, the very same record-building strategies that agencies use to
defend themselves against the threat of hard look review make it very
difficult to leave major ambiguities in the rule text itself. Even though
hard look review often focuses on the evidentiary record and the
agency’s reasoning,357 a certain level of rule clarity in the rule text is
necessary just to support the kind of thorough consideration of analysis
that courts expect. There would be a jarring disconnect between a rule
with a lengthy preamble, filled to the brim with studies, estimates, and
counterarguments, and a rule text that says not much more than that a
regulated entity should take “reasonable” steps to ensure the safety of its
plant.358
353. 164 F.3d at 660 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c) (1998)).
354. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)).
355. A back-of-the-envelope calculation, achieved by searching Westlaw’s database of
appellate briefs from the D.C. Circuit using the search terms “rule /p vague & ‘arbitrary
and capricious,’” yielded 350 briefs (as of October 2018) mentioning vagueness in close
proximity to a challenge to a rule under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
356. Preenforcement challenges, notwithstanding the principle articulated in Ruckelshaus,
are often stopped, as a practical matter, by the fact that an agency is usually “entitled to
proceed case by case or, more accurately, sub-regulation by subregulation.” Pearson, 164
F.3d at 661. Thus, an agency is not “necessarily required to define” specific terms in its
“initial general regulation.” Id.
357. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness Review Made Reasonable:
Structural and Conceptual Reform of the “Hard Look,” 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 331, 347
(2016) (noting that “as the judicial transformation of informal rulemaking took hold,
agencies had to offer far more detailed notices and explanations for their rules, which
meant that courts had a much richer set of ‘record’ materials to review”). For a thorough
overview of the dynamics (and pathologies) of record building in notice-and-comment
rulemaking, see generally Wagner, supra note 336.
358. Cf. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 660 (“To refuse to define the criteria it is applying is
equivalent to simply saying no without explanation.”).
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An example can make the point clearer. In Greater Yellowstone
Coalition, the agency’s formal plan for delisting the Yellowstone grizzly
bear population as a threatened species avoided specifying particular
risks that might justify relisting, instead offering a vague promise to care-
fully monitor the grizzly population.359 The court demanded greater
explanation of why the decline in whitebark pine, which had been linked
with grizzly mortality, would not threaten the species.360 Understandably,
the agency had not built a record about an issue that its open-ended
“management and monitoring framework” did not “even specifically dis-
cuss.”361 If the agency’s position is that the evidence does not support a
more specific standard, it will be expected to furnish that evidence, not
simply invoke uncertainty as a reason for a vague standard.362 In effect, if
an agency were to elide clarity and specificity, it would leave itself in a
bind: Its rulemaking record would likely be spotty, superficial, or both,
leaving the rule vulnerable to hard look vacatur.
Finally, agencies actually perceive clarity as a way to reduce the risk
of hard look vacatur. As part of its project on plain language in regula-
tory drafting, the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) interviewed officials at seven agencies and specifically asked
them what impact judicial review has on their incentives to use plain lan-
guage in rule writing.363 The study reports that agency officials favored
clear drafting as a means of reducing the risk of judicial reversal.364 As
one agency official noted, the agency could “defend regulations better
when we’ve developed the record and made the regulation clear and
understandable to the public.”365 Another agency official stated, “[I]f
regulations just aren’t understandable, or they can be misconstrued, you
are a lot more vulnerable legally.”366 As the authors of the ACUS report
note, agencies are aware of their audience: Article III judges who are
generalists.367 While these judges are, by virtue of their expertise, more
tolerant of complexity and more willing to “forgive certain lapses in
359. Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52
(1983) (“Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must account for uncer-
tainty, however, does not imply that it is sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms
‘substantial uncertainty’ as a justification for its actions.”); see also All. for Nat. Health U.S.
v. Sebelius, 775 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133–34 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting the kind of arbitrariness-
as-vagueness challenge described above in part because the agency had offered evidence
that it “could not ‘predict with mathematical precision’” what would be the appropriate
standard (quoting 72 Fed. Reg. 34,752, 34,787–88 (June 25, 2007))).
363. See Emerson & Blake, supra note 347, at 2.
364. See id. at 15.
365. Id.
366. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. See id.
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linguistic clarity” than the general public, judges also appear to be skepti-
cal of anything that seems like avoidable obfuscation.368
The hard look tradition thus stands in direct tension with any sup-
posed perverse incentives that might be created by Auer deference, and
the bulk of the evidence would seem to suggest it is a far greater concern
to agency officials as they take on the task of trying to write rules.369 Even
if agencies are also aware of Auer’s purported incentives, the considerable
short-term benefits of specificity and clarity as a means of avoiding costly
vacaturs are more likely to determine the behavior of boundedly rational
agency officials than the remote possibility of bootstrapping some addi-
tional discretion down the road.
CONCLUSION
For Supreme Court watchers, one of the surest bets today might be
to bet against Auer deference. With at least five of the Justices on the rec-
ord as opposing Auer deference or other forms of deference to agency
action,370 and with “continuing controversy” over Auer raging in the acad-
emy, it seems likely that the Court will use Kisor v. Wilkie as a vehicle to do
away with Auer deference, possibly replacing it with a lesser form of
deference like Skidmore deference or eliminating deference to agency
regulatory interpretations altogether.371 Yet this assault on Auer is unwar-
ranted, even on the terms laid out by Auer’s critics.
At the core of the emerging assault on Auer lies a claim about the
doctrine’s effect on agency officials’ incentives to promulgate vague rules
that expand agency discretion.372 Yet until now, that claim has never been
tested. Despite looking carefully for any trace of changed rule-writing
behavior in the aftermath of Auer and other Auer-related cases, I have
found no empirical evidence that agencies respond to Auer’s rule-writing
incentives in any systematic way. Further, I uncovered some limited
evidence that agencies have actually shifted toward greater rule clarity
over the years. This Article also identifies pressing, short-term consid-
erations, such as the risk of hard look vacatur, that explain why any
368. Id.
369. See supra section IV.C.2; see also Walker, Statutory Interpretation, supra note
149, at 1019 fig.1 (reporting survey data revealing an unimpressive awareness of Auer def-
erence among agency respondents).
370. See supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme
Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2017) (noting, presciently, “that the Court will likely address Auer’s
scope and propriety in coming Terms”).
372. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 103, 106–07 (2018) (noting that one “predominant”
argument against Auer is the claim that the “combination of law-making and law-executing
authority creates inappropriate incentives for agencies to draft vague regulations and
interpret those regulations through less-formal means after the fact”).
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supposed long-term incentives created by Auer would hold little sway. The
research presented here undermines the self-delegation thesis upon
which the critique of Auer has been grounded. If nothing else, it clearly
shifts the burden of proof to Auer’s critics if they are to continue citing
Auer’s perverse incentives as the basis for overturning or limiting the
doctrine. As this Article has shown, it is not simply that Auer’s critics have
committed the “sign fallacy,” as Sunstein and Vermeule put it,373 but that
the self-delegation thesis is, as far as the best available evidence goes,
empirically unfounded and in tension with institutional research on
administrative agencies. For all of the attention it has received, the self-
delegation thesis turns out just to be a false alarm.
The findings reported in this Article should give the Justices signifi-
cant pause as they consider what to do in Kisor. Auer deference purports
to serve important purposes in administrative law—most notably, ensuring
that agencies have flexibility to clarify the law they have written.374 Critics
of Auer believe that much of this need for ex post clarification is
unnecessary if rules are written clearly in the first instance. They claim
that agency officials operating in a world without Auer would embrace ex
ante clarity to a much greater degree than they do now.375 The evidence
amassed in this Article offers a window into this counterfactual world by
examining rule writing before Auer’s ascension and comparing it with
rule writing afterward. There is no evidence that agencies were any more
likely to front-load specificity and clarity before the Court decided
Auer.376 Consequently, were the Court to scale back Auer deference in
Kisor, it would presumably only sacrifice Auer’s current benefits with no
guarantee of any offsetting or countervailing benefits.377
In addition, the fact that agencies are not self-delegating en masse by
increasing the vagueness of their rules suggests that there exist outer
boundaries on their ability to stretch the meaning of regulatory texts in a
manner that would be unfair to regulated parties. If the existing rule
texts being interpreted have not been systematically skewed toward
vagueness by Auer’s alleged incentives, and if agency officials must still be
able to make a plausible argument that these rules in some way support
the agency’s interpretation, there will remain inherent limits on agen-
cies’ ability to avoid accountability by couching every policy change as an
interpretation of a preexisting rule.378 Agencies in this world—that is, the
373. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 104–111 and accompanying text.
375. See supra section II.A.
376. See supra sections III.B–.E.
377. Cf. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, supra note 85, at 950 (noting that overturning
Auer would have unintended consequences, and that this “cuts in favor of stare decisis”).
378. Cf. Vermeule, Law’s Abegnation, supra note 136, at 80 (“It is a simple confusion
to suggest an agency could ever ‘delegate power to itself.’ Agencies just have whatever
quantum of power they have, under relevant statutory grants of authority . . . . Judges can
always enforce the outer boundaries of the agency’s grant of authority, however exercised.”).
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world we live in—only have whatever amount of interpretive discretion
they have, given the difficult tradeoffs involved in determining the opti-
mal precision of rules in the first instance.379 Furthermore, the inter-
pretations that stem from existing regulations must at a minimum be
reasonable (even if they need not be the only possible interpretation).380
Auer’s critics might counter that the mere availability of the self-
delegation strategy is itself a constitutional harm regardless of whether
agencies actually use it. This argument proves too much. The U.S.
constitutional system is rife with opportunities for potential abuse, and the
Framers’ attitude toward these potential avenues was not to eliminate
them but to design institutions and specific textual bars that would make
abuse less likely to occur.381 The combination of evidence that agencies
do not engage in self-delegation and that they apparently have at least
some limits on their ability to operate within the bounds of the regula-
tions they have written should be enough to quell any concern that exist-
ing legal structures are failing in their fundamental task.382
In fact, the research findings presented here hold more general
implications for debates about the place of administrative agencies in the
379. See Diver, supra note 128, at 71–72 (framing a discussion on agencies’ optimal
degree of specificity in rule writing). Agencies also must comply with the anti-parroting
principle by adding some modicum of specificity beyond the original statutory delegation
of authority. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (establishing the anti-
parroting principle); see also supra note 33.
380. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr.,
568 U.S. 597, 613 (2013) (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need not
be the only possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”).
381. See The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over
men, . . . you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself.”).
382. It is worth noting that Manning’s later writings on the separation of powers are in
some tension with the self-delegation critique. Manning has argued that there is no “free-
standing principle of separation of powers” and that formalists ought to confine their
arguments to textually grounded separation of powers limitations. John F. Manning,
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1944 (2011)
[hereinafter Manning, Separation of Powers] (emphasis omitted); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers
Cases, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 21, 29 (1998) (arguing that “we ought not consider
functionalism and formalism as inevitably antipodal” because both in practice make conse-
quentialist arguments about particular arrangements of institutional power). This insis-
tence that separation of powers arguments be grounded in the text of the Constitution, lest
they simply become another form of metafunctionalist theory, runs into problems when,
as in the case of Auer, there is no constitutional text that is directly relevant to the combi-
nation of powers in administrative agencies. To reconcile the self-delegation critique with
this more textualist approach to formalism, one would have to be skeptical of much more
than just Auer in administrative law, essentially reading the vesting clauses as plain bars on
any combination of functions in agencies. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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separation of powers framework. Separation of powers formalists383 fre-
quently assert that the breakdown of the constitutional division of
authority in the administrative state will (or at least probably will) have
far-reaching consequences for limits on government power. 384 The
constitutional critique of Auer, grounded as it is in the self-delegation
thesis, is a primary example, but there are many other such arguments
that institutions or doctrines that purportedly relax the strict separation
of powers promote certain undesirable behavior.385 Such arguments tend
to catch on, in part because they rely on intuitive models of rational
behavior geared toward power seeking and hint at a relatively simple
solution: restoring some kind of strict separation, or at least greatly
diminishing the scope of administrative agencies’ authority, in an effort
to eliminate some asserted perverse incentives. But the analysis in this
Article reveals the limitations of relying on intuitions about the combina-
tion of authorities and powers in agencies. Arguments that are unteth-
ered from evidence and from an understanding of agencies as institu-
tions may be intuitively appealing but utterly mistaken. Any realistic
account of structural or doctrinal incentives must therefore grapple with
what actually motivates bureaucrats, drawing support from what empiri-
cal studies reveal about the plausibility of intuitions derived from
theory.386
This observation carries special importance at a moment of heated
debate about the future of the administrative state in the U.S. constitu-
tional system. As Professor Gillian Metzger recently noted, the
administrative state currently appears to be in the midst of crisis,
ensnared between attacks from insurgent “anti-administrativists” and
defenses from equally impassioned supporters of the administrative
state.387 Auer is a primary exhibit for the kinds of attacks being levied by
principled anti-administrativists: It is a purported example of the admin-
istrative state being predisposed or programmed by administrative law to
383. See Manning, Separation of Powers, supra note 382, at 1958 (“Formalist theory
presupposes that the constitutional separation of powers establishes readily ascertainable
and enforceable rules of separation.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of
Separation of Powers, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 225, 226 (describing formalism as “emphasizing
that ‘[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal govern-
ment into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly
as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned respon-
sibility’” (alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))).
384. See Yoo & Phillips, supra note 16 (“Our constitutional system has the genius of
diffusing power among three branches of the national government . . . . [F]orsaking the
Founders’ limits on government in the name of administrative ease would bring far more
ruin than failing to attend to the popular policy of the day.”)
385. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
386. See supra Part IV.
387. Metzger, supra note 371, at 8–46.
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“lose[] its way.”388 Auer is thought to be low-hanging fruit in this
regard389—so low, in fact, that the empirical basis for the self-delegation
thesis has been taken for granted, almost as a matter of intuition. But
intuition needs verification. Despite looking with some of the most
powerful methods available and considering different possible mani-
festations, I have been unable to detect any effect on agency rule writing
associated with Auer deference.390 Moreover, the lack of evidence of any
agency self-delegation in the rulemaking process should hardly be
surprising, if one only considers what an extensive body of social science
research teaches about agency officials’ behavioral tendencies and what
administrative law scholarship has to say about the immediate legal
concerns confronting agency decisionmakers.391 The administrative state
is an enormously complex organism, and administrative law is not the
only constraint on, or facilitator of, agency discretion.392 If it is as difficult
to demonstrate that agencies have gone off course in other areas as it has
been in the seemingly easy case of Auer, then the implication is that pat
assumptions about administrative law’s behavioral incentives should not
be enough on their own to justify calls for reform.
388. Aaron L. Nielson, Response, Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 Harv.
L. Rev. Forum 1, 1 (2017), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
vol131_Nielson.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PQ2-NV2W].
389. To be clear, Nielson himself does not appear to endorse all of the assault on
Auer—for reasons unrelated to the validity of the self-delegation thesis. See Nielson,
Beyond Seminole Rock, supra note 85.
390. See supra Part III.
391. See supra Part IV.
392. Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 27, at 95 (“[A]dministrative law is
embedded within a complex web of politics, institutions, and organizational behavior. Within
this web, law is but one factor influencing behavior in government agencies among a
variety of institutional, professional, social, financial, and political factors that interact with
each other, and . . . adapt and change over time.”).
